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1.1 An issue as old as time  
Crises and wars around the globe have for centuries forced people to find refuge in other 
countries. The rights of these people have been protected by various international agree-
ments, but only in 1951 was a conclusive agreement signed by 147 Member States of the 
United Nations. This is the 1951 Geneva Convention, which was introduced by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established in 1950 by the United 
Nations. The 1951 Convention was initially created to ensure the rights and obligations 
of World War II refugees, but in 1967 a Protocol was released which expanded the extent 
of the legislation to cover the whole population of the world. (UNCHR 2010, 2–6; UN-
CHR 2011, 1–7.)  
The European Union has been working on a harmonised asylum policy since 1999, 
when the European Council met in Tampere to establish a ‘common European asylum 
system’ (Lavenex 2001, 851). No mutual understanding was reached in Tampere, but a 
common ground for the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was formed (Lav-
enex 2001, 851; European Commission 2015). Since then the European Commission has 
taken several legislative measures to unify asylum policies within the EU (European 
Commission 2015), the latest being the revised Directives effective since July 2015.  
2015 was a particularly significant year in the history of asylum seekers in Europe and 
the EU Member States. The European Union is currently facing the largest influx of asy-
lum seekers in years (Brenke 2015, 511). How the EU handles this ‘refugee crisis’ will 
have an immense and long-lasting impact on the EU Members States and their economies. 
Troianovksi (2015, 5) concludes that the current crisis will highlight the importance of 
fair burden-sharing policies and encourage the more heavily burdened countries to de-
mand an equitable sharing of the burden. The European Commission has been working 
on common legislation throughout the year and the implementation of the revised Direc-
tives has begun. (European Union 2014, 3).  
The distribution of refugees among EU Member States is uneven and this affects coun-
tries with external borders with the EU, such as Greece, Malta and Italy the most (Brenke 
2015, 511). The CEAS aims to create a common area of protection and solidarity, and the 
European Commission has taken steps to address the pressure these countries face by 
instituting relocation programmes (European Commission 2016). These relocation pro-
grammes will allocate refugees more evenly across Member States and thus have an im-
pact on each country’s economy. A fair sharing of the burden is also crucial because a 
surge of asylum seekers and refugees has an economic impact on the host country’s econ-
omy and if the burden is shared inequitably the economic effects are also inequitable. The 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016, 4) concludes in their analysis that the current 
refugee crisis will have both short- and long-term effects on the economies of the receiv-
ing countries. Short-term effects will include for example an annual increase of 0.15 per-
cent in the population of the EU (IMF 2016, 13). The rise in population will lead to higher 
fiscal spending and it is estimated that total GDP in the EU will also be positively affected 
(IMF 2016, 14, 32).  
These demographic changes affect the national and international markets as well. The 
sheer increase in population will boost aggregate demand, which in turn will lead to in-
vestments and greater labour demand (IMF 2016, 4, 13, 23, 33). The IMF (2016, 1, 3) 
report suggests that it will take approximately two years to integrate refugees into the 
labour market. The report also highlights that a notable number of refugees have tertiary 
education. For example, in Germany, 21 percent of refugees have a tertiary degree while 
the equivalent figure for native Germans is only two percent higher (IMF 2016, 13, 17). 
According to Arora (2014, 25), young and skilled labour correlates positively with inno-
vation and increases both productivity and income per capita. The number of refugees 
will eventually boost the supply of labour force, and thus it can also have a positive effect 
on the labour opportunities and wages of the native population (IMF 2016, 22).  
A fair sharing of the burden is integral in order to overcome the crisis and handle the 
situation to the best of the EU’s abilities. Equal sharing of the burden guarantees that the 
economic effects, both negative and positive, will also be equitably distributed between 
Member States. This is crucial because the economic effects are also cumulative and long 
ranging (Arora 2014, 25; IMF 2016, 4). This thesis will examine how the burden could 
be shared more efficiently and equitable using suggestions developed in the light of the 
2015 crisis.  
1.2 Key terminology 
In order to fully comprehend the following, some key terms must be defined. In this the-
sis, the Geneva Conventions 1951 definition of a refugee mentioned before will be used 
as it is the international standard. The Geneva convention defines refugee as someone: 
  
‘who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion’ 
(Geneva Convention 1951).  
 
Bobby Thomas Cameron (2014, 9), a health policy analyst, introduces the idea that the 
1951 Geneva Convention definition excludes thousands of people in similar situations to 
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recognized refugees as not being refugees. This is largely due to the need to create a 
uniform definition in order to be able assess the “person’s worthiness of protection”. This 
implies that the number of people in situations similar to those of persons who have been 
granted international protection is much higher than the number of recognised refugees. 
(Cameron 2014, 9–10.)  
An asylum seeker, on the other hand, is defined by the UNHCR as someone who 
claims to be a refugee but who has not yet been declared a refugee (UNHCR). The main 
difference between asylum seekers and refugees is that refugees are granted a status of 
international protection. An asylum seeker is someone who has lodged a claim for asy-
lum and they have not yet been recognized as people in need of international protection. 
Cameron (2014, 10–11) defines asylum seekers to be people in search of safety. They 
differ radically from other types of migrants, because their main objective is to find safety 
(Cameron 2014, 10–11). In this thesis, the terms refugee and asylum seeker often appear 
together even though they are not used as synonyms, but because they can be seen as a 
process (asylum seekers can gain refugee status). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship be-
tween the different terms. An asylum seeker and refugee are most commonly either re-
settled in a final destination country (recognised refugee) or have travelled to the final 
destination country by themselves to claim asylum and thus in the hopes of being granted 
refugee status in the destination country. 
 
Figure 1 Chart of the relations between different terms (adopted from Dustmann et 
al. 2017, 503) 
As figure 1 demonstrates, one can receive a refugee status in different ways. The dif-
ference between a resettled recognised refugee and an asylum seeker is that even though 
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they both currently reside in the destination country the asylum seeker’s claim can be 
rejected and thus not be granted refugee status. This might lead to deportation or the asy-
lum seeker might receive temporary protection from the destination country. If the asylum 
seeker stays in the destination country illegally, they are often referred to as paperless 
persons who are often excluded from the society as not being recognised as citizens or 
residents of the destination country.  
An asylum seeker’s claim can be rejected for many reasons and sometimes these peo-
ple are labelled as economic immigrants. In this thesis, an economic immigrant is de-
fined as someone who moves to a foreign country in the hopes of improving their eco-
nomic situation (Lavenex 2001, 882). The distinction between immigrants and refugees 
is of great importance due to the current legislation, which is only binding in the case of 
refugees (Lavenex 2001, 882).  
A displaced person as defined by the United Nations educational, scientific and cul-
tural organization (UNESCO) denotes a larger term referring to people who have had to 
leave their local environment due to for example wars, natural disasters, famine or a poor 
economic situation (UNESCO 2016). In literature, the term appears to cover the true 
number of people, as it includes people who have been forced to flee their homes but have 
not yet been recognized as refugees and have not yet made a claim for asylum. In this 
thesis, only asylum seekers and refugees are discussed as they have already recognised 
their own need for international protection.  
1.3 Aim of the thesis 
“Nine Member States in the EU today receive 90% of all asylum applica-
tions annually, but those nine Member States are starting to, well, become 
fed up.” (Tobias Billström, Immigration Minister of Sweden, 3rd of March 
2014.) 
 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse what kind of burden-sharing mechanisms have been 
suggested in the light of the present crisis and how they fit to the existing theoretical 
framework. This thesis will investigate the possible burden-sharing mechanisms related 
to refugee and asylum seeker policies and reflect on their conductibility and effectiveness. 
This will be done by contrasting and comparing the post-crisis suggestions to the current 
policies and international burden-sharing theory. This will be done by conducting a qual-
itative content analysis on the recently (2015–2018) suggested methods of burden shar-
ing. The qualitative content analysis is built around the theory of international burden-
sharing methods introduced by Thielemann (2008, 3) which are explored in chapter 4. 
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The research question in this thesis is “How should the issue of burden-sharing be ad-
dressed in the EU post 2015?” To understand and effectively evaluate new suggestions, 
a look on the current distribution is provided, different definitions of ‘burden’ are dis-
cussed and the current policies in place will be explored. Sub-questions that will be ex-
plored in this thesis are:   
• Why should the issue be addressed? 
• What are the prerequisites for a working method?  
 
The research design is illustrated in figure 2, where the phases of the research have 
been divided into the aim of the thesis, the supporting information, the theoretical back-
ground, the data collection process and the analysis and results.  
 
 
Figure 2  Research design 
 
This thesis will follow the structure of the research design shown in figure 2. The 
structure is illustrated in more detail in figure 3, where the different processes are de-
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Figure 3 Structure of the thesis 
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2 DISTRIBUTION OF BURDEN-SHARING 
In the following the distributions of the burden between different EU Member States will 
be examined. An approach to the concept of burden-sharing, introduced by Thielemann 
(2008, 3) will also be examined. Burden-sharing is an integral part of solidarity within 
the EU. Leaders of the EU have stressed, even before the Common European Asylum 
System was put in place, that a common policy in asylum, migration and borders “should 
be based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility including its financial implica-
tions and closer practical co-operation between Member States” (European Council 2004, 
18).  
The concept of burden-sharing can be problematic. On the one hand, the concept of 
the “burden” can be understood to mean different things, and on the other hand, the con-
cept of “sharing” can be measured in different ways. The burden can be shared in absolute 
and relative terms, for example. The expression ‘burden-sharing’ will be used, because it 
appears in official documents as well as in scientific journals most commonly when ad-
dressing the issue. An alternative way of expressing this concept would be to use ‘respon-
sibility sharing’ as mentioned by Dustmann et al. (2017, 532) and Thielemann (2018, 74) 
who all note that responsibility-sharing can be used instead of the term ‘burden-sharing’.  
2.1 Defining burden 
In crises such as the current one, the views of politicians can differ vastly. While West- 
ern European countries see this crisis as a humanitarian one, some European countries 
see it as a threat and a burden to the host countries, because they believe that most asylum 
seekers are de facto economic immigrants rather than people seeking refuge. (Diaconu 
2015, 882; Mueller-Using & Vöpel 2014, 95). What is generally understood as the ‘bur-
den’ in the term ‘burden-sharing’ refers to the number of asylum seekers and refugees 
and the costs they generate in the host country (Brenke 2015, 511–512; Moraga & 
Rapoport 2014, 640–647).  
The term ‘burden-sharing’ appears in many contexts in literature. The term is based 
on intra-EU solidarity to share the financial, economic and cultural burden of refugees 
equally between Member States (Thielemann 2008, 2). Article 63 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty of 1997 (2002, 58) states that the Council will take into use methods that pro- 
mote: “a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the conse-
quences of receiving refugees and displaced persons”. The recently updated Common 
European Asylum Policy also strives for a more equal sharing of the burden (European 
Commission 2015). Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 644) also note that the European Refu-
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gee Fund, established in 2000 and later rearranged as the AMIF, helps even out the finan-
cial burden borne by those countries receiving more refugees than they would were the 
burden equally distributed.  
In this thesis other ways of understanding the meaning of ‘burden’ in the concept of 
‘burden-sharing’ are also examined. Hosting asylum seekers and refugees in a host coun-
try is a reactive measure. Besides reactive measures, Member States can also engage in 
proactive measures, such as those proposed by Thielemann (2008, 7) as peacekeeping 
missions, humanitarian aid and education in the countries of origin of the asylum seekers 
and refugees. Broadening the definition of ‘burden’ would give a more comprehensive 
understanding of the contributions made by each Member State.  
2.2 Distribution of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU 
The European Union’s role as a region that receives asylum seekers has been a major one 
for a long time. According to data from the UNCHR, which was analysed by Hatton 
(2009, 185), the EU-15 received 68 percent of all asylum applications lodged between 
1980 and 2005. In more recent years, Brenke (2015, 1) states that the European Union is 
facing “its largest influx of asylum seekers in years”. Large influxes of asylum seekers 
generally occur after major conflicts, such as wars or natural disasters (Hatton 2009, 86).  
The geographical location of the conflict has a major impact on which countries or 
regions are most affected by the surge of asylum seekers, but it is not the only criterion. 
The West has been seen as a preferable receiving region due to its more advanced econ-
omy and welfare system. (Hatton 2009, 209.) Based on the data from the UNCHR ana-
lysed by Hatton (2009, 188), European countries such as Germany, France and the UK 
have over the years received larger amounts of asylum claims than other countries. 
Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 640) concluded that 79 percent of all asylum seekers, who 
came to the EU in 2012, arrived in one of the six following countries: Germany, France, 
Greece, Austria, UK and Sweden. Figure 4 illustrates the geographical distribution of 
refugees and people in refugee-like situations (UNHCR 2015).  
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Figure 4 Geographical distribution of refugees and persons in refugee-like situa-
tion in 2015 (UNHCR 2015). 
As can be seen from figure 4, the recent conflict in the Middle East has logically led 
to a surge in the number of asylum seekers in Europe due to its geographical proximity. 
The figures show that the distribution of these asylum seekers has not been equitable 
among EU Member States. Countries with external borders with the EU have been placed 
under immense pressure to cope with the growing amount of asylum seekers. These in-
clude, in particular, Greece, Italy and Malta (Brenke 2015, 1). Owing to the Dublin policy 
of the country of first entry, the Member States with external borders with the EU are 
under the greatest strain. The Dublin policy states that an asylum seeker must submit his 
or her claim in the Member State where they first arrive. (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 639; 
European Commission 2017b)  
The European Union has created an EU Resettlement Programme to resettle refugees 
more evenly among Member States (Moraga and Rapoport 2015, 644). A resettlement 
programme can ease some pressure from the countries with external borders. The effec-
tiveness of the EU Resettlement Programme is debatable. Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 
644) suggest that the “EU has failed to implement the program on a large scale”. Statis- 
tics from the UNHCR (2013) analysed by Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 644) suggest that 
around five percent of the total number of refugees in the world were resettled under the 
Resettlement Programme. 
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2.3 Relative distribution 
Whilst it can be concluded from statistics and previous studies that the distribution of 
asylum seekers and refugees in the EU has not been equitable in terms of the absolute 
amount of asylum seekers and refugees, we should further investigate the relative distri-
bution of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU. Comparing absolute asylum figures 
when analysing the country-specific burdens of Member States is often deceptive. The 
notion of a relatively even distribution of asylum seekers and refugees denotes the idea 
of a proportionate distribution based on given predetermined country-specific factors, 
such as financial, economic, demographic and geographical capabilities. (Brenke 2015, 
1; Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 642; Thielemann 2008, 2).  
When factoring in the population of the receiving country, Member States such as the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden prove to be among the most heavily burdened coun-
tries. For example, between 1994 and 2002 these Member States were among those with 
the highest rates of asylum seekers per capita. (Thielemann 2008, 2–3.) Moraga and 
Rapoport (2014, 642) found in their research that the six countries in Europe receiving 
the highest numbers of refugees in terms of absolute values were Germany, France, 
Greece, Austria, the UK and Sweden. In relative terms, their studies showed that even 
between these six countries the burdens vary considerably. According to their research, 
Germany and Sweden plus Switzerland, which was not among the six largest receiving 
countries in Europe, host a relatively large number of refugees when compared to their 
geographic size and population. (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 640.) 
Figure 5 is an illustrative graph of the percent of asylum seekers that would have to be 
redistributed to reach a fair sharing of the burden when accounting for population. The 
calculations show that the inequitableness of sharing the burden rose notably during the 
early 1990s and has begun to rise significantly again in 2012. Since then it has been on 
the rise. An interesting conclusion of the studies is that the burden is shared more equita-
bly between EU-15 Member States than among the entire EU-27 area as the Hoover index 
in figure 5 demonstrates. (Brenke 2015, 512–513.) 
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Figure 5 Hoover index of concentration of asylum seekers across countries of the 
EU in relation to the population of the countries (Brenke 2015, 513). 
Figure 5 reveals that the percentage of asylum seekers that should be redistributed were 
the burden shared equitably according to population was the lowest just prior to onset of 
the current crisis when it was just over 20 percent. An inequitable distribution is on the 
rise again and approaching 50 percent, meaning that over half of all asylum seekers should 
be redistributed were the burden to be shared equally between the Member States accord-
ing to population. (Brenke 2015, 512–513.)  
A conclusion can be made in light of these studies that the distribution of asylum seek-
ers and refugees in the EU and Europe has been and still is uneven. During the current 
crisis, it has been learned that most refugees and asylum seekers are currently headed for 
central Europe, Sweden and Member States with external borders. This suggests that 
these countries are faced with a bigger burden than they would have were the burden 
distributed evenly. (Brenke 2015, 511.)  
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3 POLICIES CURRENTLY IN PLACE  
3.1 The Common European Asylum System and the Revised Direc-
tives 
The European Union has worked towards a common asylum system since the 1999 EU 
Council meeting (Lavenex 2001, 851). The harmonisation of asylum policies continued 
up until 2005. In 2008 the European Commission issued a Policy Plan on Asylum in 
response to the 2007 Green Paper, which discussed the development of the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System (CEAS). (European Commission 2015.)  
The most recent changes to the EURODAC Regulation, part of the CEAS, were im-
plemented in July 2015. This date was also the deadline for Member States to transpose 
their national laws and regulations to match the revised Directives and Regulations. The 
revised Directives and Regulations were put into place in 2013. (European Commission 
2015.) 
3.1.1 The revised Asylum Procedures Directive 
The revised Asylum Procedures Directive defines how one can apply for asylum in an 
EU Member State and how the processing and handling of the claim should be conducted 
by the Member State receiving the claim. The previous asylum procedures Directive has 
been deemed too vague, failing to guarantee the basic standards for processing an asylum 
claim that the asylum seeker is eligible for. The revised Asylum Procedures Directive sets 
out a clear set of rules for Member States to follow. These common rules are supposed to 
make the process more efficient and decrease the processing time. (European Union 2014, 
2–4; European Commission 2015.)  
The revised Directive also better ensures the safety of unaccompanied minors and vic-
tims of torture. It also specifies the asylum seeker’s right to appeal. New rules on appeals 
aim to reduce the amount of cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights, 
thus decreasing the costs and involvement of the European Court of Human Rights. (Eu-
ropean Union 2014, 2–4; European Commission, Asylum Procedures 2016; European 
Commission 2015.)  
The 2015 refugee crisis has demonstrated the inability of the revised Asylum Proce-
dures Directives to reach its goal a proposal for the reform of the entire system was made 
in July 2016. The reform is intended to be “fair and efficient” and to remove incentives 
of asylum shopping and secondary movement. The goal is to establish a truly international 
protection procedure which would further harmonise the policies between Member 
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States. Actions the European Commission plans to take to reach this goal are for example 
simplifying procedures, shortening application periods and an EU-wide list of safe coun-
tries of origin (currently safe countries of origin are listed at national level only). (Euro-
pean Commission 2017c.)  
A set of common procedures also serve to harmonise the pull factors of different Mem-
ber States so that a country cannot appear unappealing to asylum seekers because of a 
stricter policy on asylum procedures. Thielemann (2008, 6) suggests that policy harmo-
nisation might in fact counteract the efforts of equal distribution, because Member States 
are unable to use national laws and regulations to counterbalance their “unique structural 
pull-factors” such as language, labour market, colonial ties etc. Hatton (2009, 209), on 
the other hand, notes that scientific studies have been able to prove a positive relationship 
between tougher policies, especially those that reduce the success rate of a claim being 
approved, and the decline of asylum applications. This means, however, that national 
asylum policies could be used to counterbalance large influxes of asylum applications 
and thus redistribute the burden. 
3.1.2 Revised Reception Conditions Directive 
The Reception Conditions Directive aims to define the conditions set up for asylum seek-
ers while they wait for their claim to processed. The Reception Conditions Directive is 
derived from the basic human rights defined by the United Nations. It ensures the right to 
“housing, food, healthcare and employment, as well as medical and psychological care”. 
(European Union 2014, 2, 5; European Commission 2015.)  
The revised policy has taken measures to further define the common rules each EU 
Member State must comply with. In particular, the revised policy defines the reasons why 
an asylum seeker can be held in detention, limits the detention of vulnerable persons, 
defines important legal rights asylum seekers have when given a detention order, specifies 
the conditions of detention facilities and guarantees access to employment. The policy 
also further amplifies the role of vulnerable persons and the special care they need. (Eu-
ropean Union 2014, 2, 5; European Commission 2015.)  
The reform of the CEAS includes a proposal for a new Reception Conditions Directive 
which further aims at harmonising the implementation of the Directives in each Member 
State to reduce the incentive for secondary movement. The proposal includes actions to 
make the integration process of refugees to the labour market faster, thus decreasing the 
incentive to secondary movement due to labour and economic incentives. (European 
Commission 2017b.)  
The effects of policy harmonisation on the revised Reception Conditions Directive are 
similar to those of the revised Asylum Procedures Directive. Thielemann (2008, 6) notes 
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that in addition to national asylum policies, factors that affect the choice of a desirable 
host country are structural. Structural factors include for example employment opportu-
nities, historical networks and geography (Thielemann 2008, 6). Brenke’s (2015, 515) 
findings support this claim, as he concludes that asylum seekers often seek refuge from a 
country where displaced persons from the same originating country have previously been 
granted refuge. Employment opportunities also play a huge role and asylum seekers 
whose claims are rejected are commonly classified as economic migrants (Hatton 2009, 
183; Diaconu 2016, 882). By contrast, Hatton’s (2009, 209) studies suggest that tougher 
asylum policies which weaken socio-economic conditions do not correlate positively with 
fewer asylum applications.  
3.1.3 Revised Qualification Directive 
The Qualification Directive “specifies the grounds for granting international protection” 
(European Union 2014, 6). The previous version of the Directive was too vague to ensure 
a fair handling of asylum claims, since the probability of an asylum seeker being granted 
refugee status could vary enormously between different Member States. The revised Di-
rective aims to improve the decision-making process and to ensure people eligible for 
international protection the protection they need. (European Union 2014, 2, 6; European 
Commission 2015.)  
The revised Directive sets out a clear set of criteria for granting asylum, thus making 
the process faster and more efficient. It also aims to reduce the number of fraudulent 
claims. The Directive also describes the rights all persons granted international protection 
are entitled to, including employment and healthcare. (European Union 2014, 2, 6; Euro-
pean Commission 2015.)  
After the 2015 refugee crisis, the revised Qualification Directive has been examined 
and like other directives, a new proposal has been made to ensure harmonised rules be- 
tween Member States and to guarantee the convergence of asylum decisions. The new 
2016 proposal includes measures that further specify the period of international protection 
that is sufficient and address the movement and rights of the beneficiaries of a person 
who has been granted a refugee status. (European Commission 2017a.)  
One of the main goals listed in the CEAS is to examine claims against “uniform stand-
ards so that, no matter where an applicant applies, the outcome will be similar” (European 
Commission, 2015). Hatton’s (2009, 189) comprehensive studies conclude that over the 
period from 1982 to 2006 28 percent of all claims were accepted, 18 percent of which 
were granted refugee status and the rest were allowed to stay on humanitarian grounds 
(Hatton 2009, 189). This means that around two-thirds of asylum claims were rejected. 
Brenke’s (2015, 516) more recent study comes to the same conclusion using Germany as 
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an example: around one third of the asylum claims lodged between January and July 2015 
were accepted, the rest being rejected or forwarded to another Member State under the 
Dublin Regulation (Brenke 2015, 516). Troianovski (2015, 5) also notes that the second 
largest group of asylum seekers in Germany does not come from war zones, but from 
within the European area from less economically developed locations. This correlates 
with the high amount of rejections, as most of these European countries are seen as ‘safe 
countries of origin’ (European Union 2015). 
3.1.4 Revised Dublin Regulation 
The idea behind the Dublin Regulation was to ensure that the burden of asylum seekers 
would be distributed evenly among Member States and that all asylum claims would be 
handled in only one EU Member State. The Dublin Regulation has failed to reach this 
goal and it has been recognized that the EU needs to be able to address situations where 
certain Member States are pressurized beyond their capacity to handle the situation. (Eu-
ropean Union 2014, 2, 7; European Commission 2015.)  
The revised Regulation aims for the EU to be better prepared for crisis situations, 
equipped to address the problems of the national asylum systems and to deal with the 
pressure. It also guarantees asylum seekers the right to personal interviews, legal assis-
tance and the possibility of being considered irregular immigrants instead of asylum seek-
ers. The Regulation also clarifies the duties of the Member States in relation to the Dublin 
procedure and transfer decisions. (European Union 2014, 2, 7; European Commission 
Dublin 2015; European Commission 2015.)  
The Dublin Regulation has been heavily criticized throughout its existence. De 
Bruycker et al. (2010, 157–159) conclude that the Dublin Regulation has failed in three 
ways: (1) it has failed to cope with the inequitable treatment of asylum seekers across the 
Member States, (2) it has not succeeded in improving the integration of asylum systems 
and guaranteeing the safety of the applicants and (3) it has not been able to carry out 
transfers, thus wasting resources. The EU Commission has also recognized this problem 
and in its Green Paper, concluded that the Dublin System may in fact hinder fair burden-
sharing, as countries with external borders are faced with “particular migratory pressures 
because of their geographical location” (Commission of the European Communities 
2007, 10). De Bruycker et al. (2010, 163) also recognize the same problem and suggest 
that the Dublin System counteracts fair burden-sharing.  
In response to the heavy criticism of the Dublin Regulation especially during the ref-
ugee crisis of 2015, the Commission has reviewed its policies and a revised Dublin Reg-
ulation (IV) has been proposed in the proposal of the CEAS Reform. The changes pro-
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posed to the Dublin Regulation aim at tackling the issue for which it has been most heav-
ily criticised: fair and equitable sharing of responsibility. It has been proposed that the 
issue be addressed by adding a corrective allocation system to the Dublin Regulation. 
This would mean that if one Member State receives a disproportionate (in accordance to 
its size and wealth) number of claims, all further claims are relocated until the application 
number falls back below the reference level set by the EU. The indicators used to define 
initial relocation distribution are population size, GDP, unemployment rate and the num-
ber of spontaneous asylum claims and the number of resettled refugees between 2010 and 
2014. The new proposal also includes an option to temporarily opt out of the reallocation 
system for a contribution of 250 000 euros per person assigned to that Member State 
under the new proposal. (European Commission 2017d.) It should be noted that this is 
still a proposal and not the current regulation.  
3.1.5 Revised EURODAC Regulation 
EURODAC is a fingerprint database that enables the Member States to process asylum 
claims and act on the Dublin Regulation more effectively. The EURODAC has been col-
lecting fingerprint data from asylum seekers since 2003 and since then has proven to be 
a very effective IT tool. (European Union 2014, 2, 8; European Commission 2015.)  
The previous EURODAC Regulation did not set Member States proper time limits for 
fingerprint data to be transmitted to the EURODAC Central system. The revised Regula-
tion tackles this issue by setting new time limits for the fingerprints to be transmitted, 
thus keeping the database more up to date. A significant change to the EURODAC Reg-
ulation is that the fingerprint database is no longer limited to the use of asylum purposes, 
but can now be used by the national police forces and Europol to further investigate crim-
inal activities. This broadening of the Regulation has been put in place to clamp down on 
serious crime and terrorism. The revised EURODAC Regulation plays a major part in 
regulating the Dublin Regulation, as it increases and facilitates information exchange be-
tween Member States. The CEAS Reform proposes that in addition to a fingerprint, also 
an additional biometric identifier would be taken of all incoming third country persons. 
The Reform also proposes that fingerprints could be used to facilitate return procedures 
of third country persons who have not submitted a claim for asylum within five years of 
arriving. (European Union 2014, 2, 8; European Commission 2015; European Commis-
sion 2017e.)  
Due to a unified Pan-European free-movement area and the removal of border con-
trols, which makes it hard to limit the mobility of non-EU citizens, including asylum 
seekers, the EURODAC is an important tool. The ability for third country nationals to 
move freely within the EU might also discourage countries with external borders with the 
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EU to follow the EURODAC Regulation, as it would only lead to an increase in the num-
ber of asylum seekers they are responsible for. For example, Greece has received an in-
fringement decision from the European Commission for failing to comply with the EU-
RODAC Regulation (European Commission – press release 2015).  
3.2 Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
Before the Asylum, migration and integration fund (AMIF) was founded, the European 
Refugee Fund (ERF) was created to assist in burden-sharing. Since asylum claims in the 
EU are not equally distributed between Member States, the ERF was created to be able 
to allocate funds to countries facing more pressure from higher application numbers. The 
ERF co-finances, for example, reception accommodation infrastructures and service im-
provements, legal and social assistance for refugees and asylum seekers and intra-EU 
transfers. The EU states that the ERF plays a part in guaranteeing European solidarity by 
allocating funds and co-funding projects that guarantee displaced persons “access to con-
sistent, fair and effective asylum procedures”. For the years 2014–2020, the ERF forms 
part of the EU solidarity Action and the EU funding for Home Affairs. The ERF was re-
organized for the years 2014 through 2020 into the Asylum, Migration and Integration 
Fund (AMIF), which focuses on the following four objectives: asylum, legal migration 
and integration, return and solidarity. From the viewpoint of asylum-seeking refugee pol-
icy, it aids in developing the CEAS, ensures safe and effective return methods and super-
vises solidarity related to asylum flow issues in the Member States. (European Commis-
sion 2014; European Commission, Home Affairs 2011, 1–12.)  
Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 644) suggest that the ERF was put in place to increase 
financial solidarity between Member States and to share the burden more equally. Moraga 
and Rapoport also note that the ERF might be one step towards “a more solidary union”, 
but that these measures do not take into account the preferences of the asylum seekers 
and refugees. Thielemann (2008, 6) concludes that while the ERF has used its funds to 
compensate countries receiving more applications, it has not succeeded in encouraging 
Member States with smaller burdens to consent to taking more responsibility. Voluntary 
responsibility-taking tends to be inefficient because the compensation provided by the 
ERF fund for each additional asylum seeker does not cover the true costs of the additional 
asylum seeker (Thielemann 2008, 7).  
The ERF has also been criticized of its disproportionate funding, as it was based on 
the absolute number of asylum seekers and refugees. This means that larger countries 
receive a relatively larger amount of funding compared with smaller countries with big- 
ger relative burdens, for example, the asylum seeker ratio to population. (Thielemann 
2005, 819–820.) Thus, the fund has not contributed to fair sharing of the burden as much 
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as it could have, were the funds distributed according to relative burdens. An under- 
achieving fair sharing mechanism demotes the notion of solidarity.  
3.3 EU Resettlement Programme 
The EU Resettlement Programme is part of the burden-sharing and solidarity programme. 
The goal of the programme is to resettle recognized refugees in EU Member States. The 
number of refugees resettled within the EU is rather low compared to countries such as 
the United States and Canada. This is partly due to the fact that the EU receives consid-
erably more ‘spontaneous asylum seekers’ and most Member States lack a resettlement 
programme. The ERF plays a large part in funding resettlement programmes and other 
activities under the EU Resettlement Programme. (European Commission, External As-
pects 2015; Decision No 281/2012/EU 2012, 1–2.)  
Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 644) argue that “the EU has failed to implement the re- 
settlement programme on a large scale”, despite its crucial role in the burden-sharing 
mechanism currently in place. For the burden to be shared more equally, the EU Reset-
tlement Programme should complement the Dublin Regulation and support resettlement 
of refugees in EU Member States, since some Member States are under particular pressure 
and face a larger burden due to their geographical location (Moraga and Rapoport 2014, 
639-647). The European Commission (2017d) has recognised this problem and the CEAS 
reform proposal suggests that an allocation programme should be integrated into the Dub-
lin Regulation.  
One of the main flaws in the EU Resettlement Programme is that it only resettles rec-
ognized refugees and the number of recognized refugees is relatively small (Djajic 2014, 
83). Djajic (2014, 92) argues that some individuals have a better chance at receiving ref-
uge if they arrive by means of questionable and often illegal methods. This highlights a 
sub-optimal level of usage of the EU Resettlement Programme. Integrating the allocation 
system into the Dublin Regulation would make the resettlement programme more effi-
cient, as allocation of refugees can be done at the same time as the application is received. 
(European Commission 2017d.) 
3.4 Directive on Temporary Protection 
The EU recognized the need for preparation of mass influxes of displaced persons long 
before the 2015 refugee crisis. The temporary protection directive was established in the 
aftermath of the 1990s conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo. The temporary pro-
tection directive is defined as an ‘exceptional measure’ to provide people temporary and 
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immediate protection. It was initially created to cope with mass influx cases where the 
CEAS could not cope with the number of claims being lodged. The temporary protection 
directive allows a certain group to be classified as eligible for temporary protection with-
out further assessments. (European Commission 2016.) 
So far, the directive has not been implemented in the 2015 crisis and its aftermath. 
Some reasons for non-implementation are uncoordinated responses of Member States and 
lack of agreed indicators for measuring what counts as ‘pressure’ or ‘mass influx’. (Eu-
ropean Commission 2016b, 3–4.) 
Generally, the temporary protection directive in its current form cannot be regarded as 
very successful. The European Commission (2016b, 1) itself notes that the implementa-
tion of the temporary protection directive has been inconsistent and policies in Member 
States ‘highly discretionary’ already during the 1990s conflicts. On the other hand, the 
European Commission (2016b, 2) notes that the temporary protection directive has a sol-
idarity system already embedded in it. The countries responding to the crisis are subsi-
dized through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund. Receiving displaced persons 
is still a voluntary action, though, and thus creates weaknesses in the implementation of 
the directive. (European Commission 2016b, 1–2.) The temporary protection directive 
can therefore be seen as an effort to create a multi-dimensional soft mechanism for bur-
den-sharing in the EU. As can be concluded from the overview of the current legislation, 
the EU has a variety of tools to address the issue. The next chapter will take a look at the 
existing theory on international burden-sharing mechanisms.  
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4 INTERNATIONAL BURDEN-SHARING MECHANISMS 
Thielemann (2008, 3) defines two main regimes of international burden-sharing: one- 
dimensional and multi-dimensional regimes. These regimes are then divided into mecha-
nisms according to the required level of imperativeness of the mechanisms. Thielemann 
(2008, 3) describes the level of imperativeness by hard (imperative) and soft (voluntary). 
Examples of these mechanisms are shown below in Table 1, which has been modified 
from Thielemann’s (2008, 3) original table by adding examples proposed by Thielemann 
(2008, 3–8). 
Table 1 International burden-sharing mechanisms (adopted from Thielemann 
2008, 3). 
 One-dimensional Multi-dimensional 
Hard Binding rules, redistributive 
quotas 
Explicit compensation 
Soft Voluntary pledging, temporary 
protection 
Implicit trade, proactive and reactive 
measures 
 
As can be seen from table 1, one-dimensional imperative mechanisms are for example 
binding rules (Thielemann 2008, 3). Binding rules are a hard, imperative action, in which 
all Member States need to take part on equal terms. One-dimensional soft mechanisms 
can be for example voluntary pledging programmes. The amount of responsibility taken 
by a Member States is partly voluntary-based. Multi-dimensional mechanisms are also 
divided into hard and soft ones. Explicit compensations are seen as a hard mechanism, 
while implicit trade is seen as a soft mechanism. Thielemann (2008, 4) understands ex-
plicit compensation to denote mechanisms where countries can trade their quota of the 
burden for money or a similar good. On the other hand, in Thielemann’s (2008, 4) terms, 
implicit trade refers to a method where countries can contribute either in a proactive or 
reactive way. (Thielemann 2008, 3–4.)  
4.1 One-dimensional mechanisms 
4.1.1 Hard one-dimensional mechanisms 
As previously discussed, an example of one-dimensional hard mechanisms is binding 
policies (Thielemann 2008, 3). The intention of common policies is to reduce the amount 
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of corrective actions needed (Thielemann 2008, 3) and to ensure all asylum seekers and 
refugees receive equal treatment in every EU Member State; in other words, to prevent a 
certain Member State from appearing more appealing than others, which helps equalize 
asylum seeker flows. Policy harmonisation is, according to Thielemann (2008, 3), also an 
example of a one-dimensional imperative mechanism. Thus, it can be argued that the 
current (2015) harmonisation and revision of policies that the EU has agreed on is a one-
dimensional imperative mechanism.  
Another example of a one-dimensional hard mechanism is the method of redistributive 
quotas, where a certain party decides upon a distribution of quotas between the Member 
States (Thielemann 2008, 3). The idea behind redistributive quotas is to equalize the bur-
den of each Member State. The EU Resettlement Programme can also be seen as an ex-
ample of such a mechanism. The EU Resettlement Programme serves to balance inequi-
ties between EU Member States (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 644).  
4.1.2 Soft one-dimensional mechanisms 
An example of a one-dimensional soft mechanism is a voluntary pledging system, where 
countries with smaller burdens can assist countries with larger burdens. This kind of 
mechanism is usually applied when a quota cannot be agreed upon and/or a crisis strikes. 
The voluntary pledging system was used for example during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. 
The UNHCR encouraged countries to aid in hosting the refugees of the crisis to alleviate 
the pressure faced by the countries with external borders with Kosovo. (Thielemann 2008, 
3–4).  
Thielemann (2008, 4) suggests that the EU Council Directive on Temporary Protection 
in the Case of Mass Influx is an example of a one-dimensional soft mechanism. The Di-
rective (2001/55/EC) aims to put in place “an exceptional scheme to deal with possible 
cases of mass arrivals in the European Union (EU) of foreign nationals who cannot return 
to their countries, in particular due to a war, violence or human rights violations. The 
legislation puts in place immediate temporary protection for these displaced persons and 
promotes a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving them and bearing the 
consequences of such reception.” (Council Directive 2001/55/EC Summary, 1). The in-
tention is to decrease the bureaucracy of granting asylum if it is clear that a certain group 
of people is in need of temporary protection. The Directive is a soft mechanism because 
Member States participating in it can estimate their capacity for receiving persons in need 
of temporary protection and can voluntarily take in more people if they wish to do so. 
(Council Directive 2001/55/EC, Chapter VI, article 25). If the Directive were ever to be 
applied, it would be a one-dimensional soft mechanism, because the number of asylum 
seekers and refugees is the only dimension and the mechanism is based on voluntariness. 
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4.2 Multi-dimensional mechanisms 
4.2.1 Hard multi-dimensional mechanisms 
As the name suggests, multi-dimensional mechanisms aim to take into account more than 
one dimension when distributing the burden. An example of a multi-dimensional hard 
mechanism would be for example a trade system similar to the Kyoto emission trading 
scheme. Participating countries would be able to exchange their share of the burden for 
money or a similar good. It would incorporate a market-based solution, which takes into 
account the cost efficiency of hosting an asylum seeker or a refugee. This way the market 
would allocate the hosting of asylum seekers and refugees to places where it is the most 
cost-efficient. Such a system was suggested by Peter Schuck in 1997. (Thielemann 2008, 
3; Schuck 1997). Schuck’s proposal (1997, 297) is to create a system that is regionally 
based, commonly agreed on and would consist of a market with an option to trade. 
Schuck’s (1997, 269, 297) model’s goals are, for example, to maximize resources by 
market allocation, to make a model that is simple to apply and to take into account human 
rights issues and to improve the quality of protection. Schuck’s (1997, 246) model is 
based on the assumption that the number of refugees is a given, which means it does not 
account for preventive measures.  
Thielemann (2008, 5) recognizes the European Refugee Fund (ERF) as a multi-dimen-
sional burden-sharing mechanism, as it allocates funds to countries receiving the largest 
numbers of refugees and displaced people. As previously noted, the ERFs funds do not 
currently cover the real costs of an asylum seeker (Thielemann 2008, 7). Consequently, 
the ERF is incapable of functioning as an effective trade instigator, because market par-
ticipation is not rational in economic terms (Thielemann 2008, 7–8; Moraga & Rapoport 
2014, 650–653).  
4.2.2 Soft multi-dimensional mechanisms 
Multi-dimensional soft mechanisms are mechanisms that take into account a wider range 
of operations that can be seen to ease the burden (Thielemann 2008, 4). This means that 
both proactive and reactive measures are taken into account when dividing the burden. 
Proactive measures are actions taken beforehand and in order to “halt the escalation of 
potential refugee problems” (Thielemann 2008, 4). Reactive methods are those which we 
usually define as measures taken to lighten the burden, such as hosting refugees. (Thiele-
mann 2008, 4.)  
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A multi-dimensional soft mechanism would be for example, implicit trade, which 
would take into account both proactive and reactive measures. As Thielemann (2008, 7) 
implies, explicit trade systems such as ones similar to the Kyoto emission scheme have 
been heavily criticized. According to Thielemann (2008, 7), implicit systems, instead, 
would take into account each country’s comparative advantage and make the system more 
effective.  
By taking into account each country’s comparative advantages, whether it be in pro- 
active measures such as peacekeeping operations or in reactive measures such as hosting 
asylum seekers and refugees, the mechanism would allocate resources where they can be 
most effectively used. For example, a country with a large army and experience in peace-
keeping missions can be expected to be much more efficient in peacekeeping measures 
and show a higher success rate than would a country with a small or no army. The same 
applies to reactive measures, i.e. countries which already have well-established, working 
asylum seeker and refugee reception programmes are much better placed to successfully 
handle asylum claims within appropriate time frames than countries with no specific in-
frastructure or experience in handling asylum claims. (Thielemann 2008, 7.) Mueller-
Using and Vöpel (2014, 97) also suggest that improving living conditions in the countries 
of origin will decrease the number of economic migrants, who according to Hatton (2009, 
183) often apply for asylum, thus improving living conditions could decrease the total 
number of asylum applications. This has been proven to be true, as Engelen (2015, 29) 
notes that cuts in humanitarian aid in the refugee camps increased migrant flows to the 
European Union.  
Specializing in a country-specific strength also has political implications. Thielemann 
(2008, 8) uses post-war Germany as an example. Due to its historical legacy, Germany 
has often chosen to avoid ‘out of area’ military interventions, and has instead focused on 
a policy of non-intervention, contributing instead by for example accepting large amounts 
of asylum seekers and refugees. Engelen (2015, 28) even argues that individual politi-
cians’ careers can be affected by the chosen approach to a crisis. The British and the 
French governments, which actively participate in peacekeeping missions, have requested 
that their efforts be taken into account when burdens are being divided between the Mem-
ber States (Council resolution 1995, 95/C 262/01). Lavenex’s (2001, 870) conclusion that 
European refugee policies will most likely move towards prevention-oriented policies 
due to EU’s significant political and economic role, supports the argument of incorporat-
ing proactive measures as part of the burden-sharing responsibilities.  
Thielemann (2008, 8) argues that the distribution of the burden is unequitable when 
looking at proactive or reactive measures alone. On the other hand, when looking at it as 
a whole, one can see that countries naturally contribute more to the actions, whether pro-
active or reactive, in which they are most effective. Thus, it can be argued, contrary to the 
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established interpretation, that the burden is in effect not as unevenly distributed as is 
generally claimed.  
A multi-dimensional soft mechanism would offer Member States a chance to con- 
tribute to the issue by means of measures that they can politically justify and to use their 
experience and existing infrastructure. The voluntariness of the mechanism consists of 
the choice of contributing proactively and/or reactively. An implicit trade between pro- 
active and reactive measures makes it possible to allocate resources where they are most 
effectively used and to distribute the burden more equally between the Member States. 
(Thielemann 2008, 3–8.) 
The current existing Directive on Temporary Protection can be viewed as multi-di-
mensional since it uses explicit financial compensation when activated. Multi-dimen-
sional soft mechanisms are usually based on implicit compensation systems. Even though 
the compensation is explicit rather than implicit the Directive on Temporary Protection 
can be seen a as soft mechanism, because it is based on voluntariness. The European 
Commission (2016b, 6–7) suggests a few ways of developing the directive. Firstly, the 
definition of a mass influx should be made into a non-exhaustive list, which would clarify 
and enhance its functionality. Secondly, cooperation between institutions, agencies and 
Member States could be streamlined and the rights of asylum seekers could be aligned. 
Lastly, the Commission suggests that a mandatory automatic relocation system without 
voluntarism be introduced. This would make the mechanism more binding and harder and 








5 RESEARCH DESIGN  
5.1 Content analysis as a research method 
This research has been conducted as a qualitative content analysis. A qualitative method 
has been chosen, because the research question is a complex one and of an interpretative 
nature. There are no set definitions for a burden or for what is equitable. These are terms 
which will be explored and defined within the framework of this thesis to allow the rich-
ness of these terms to be exploited, but at the same time ensure consistency throughout 
the research. These terms will be explored in the following chapters and the definitions 
will lay the ground for the content analysis. 
Qualitative content analysis has been chosen as a research method because it is well 
equipped to recognise trends, patterns and differences in large pools of data (Krippendorff 
1967, 34–36). Qualitative content analysis is able to describe the collected data only if 
the right questions are posed. It is not equipped to analyse the data from each and every 
aspect, but rather offers the researcher the ability to use a vast amount of data for specific 
questions, as it is well equipped to reduce data into information. (Schreier 2012, 3–4.) As 
the research question is of a complex nature, qualitative content analysis fits the require-
ments well. In this case, it allows the researcher to specify the research angle through the 
research question. In this thesis, the research question is focused on burden-sharing meth-
ods, reasonings and prerequisites for a system. The qualitative content analysis method 
enables the use of a mass amount of data to answer these questions, with the aim of re-
ceiving a holistic understanding of the questions and the available options. Schreier 
(2012, 8) notes that using qualitative content analysis may lead to loss of information on 
the individual level, but in exchange the research gains information on an aggregate level. 
In the terms of this study it means that even though a single method, reasoning or prereq-
uisite might be missed or not researched, the study will give a more thorough understand-
ing of the totality of the data and the topic. 
The chosen method is always partly data-driven, which means that the collected data 
will influence the possibilities of the content analysis and set the framework for it. This 
research also exploits existing theory as a base for the research. This qualitative content 
analysis was using the following phases: 
1. Selecting and collecting data 
2. Building a coding frame around the theory 
3. Coding the data into units of coding 
4. Testing the coding frame 
5. Modifying the coding frame if necessary 
6. Analysing the data from the content analysis 
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The specific methods of data collection and conducting the content analysis are ex-
plored in the following sections.  
With the aid of the qualitative content analysis, this research attempted to answer the 
research question of is how the issue of burden-sharing should be addressed in the EU 
post 2015. The research also attempted to identify reasons for addressing the issue and 
prerequisites for a working mechanism. The results of the content analysis were analysed, 
and possible mechanisms were compared and contrasted with the current legislation and 
systems in order to evaluate their potential. The following sections will cover the research 
process from data collection to the actual content analysis including an evaluation of the 
study, whilst the subsequent chapters will discuss the results of the content analysis. 
5.2 Data collection  
Qualitative data has been chosen for this research because, within this topic, qualitative 
data is more available and better describes the phenomenon. Qualitative data is also more 
suitable for broadening understanding of the topic, which is the aim of the research ques-
tion, rather than to use quantitative data to test a particular theory, for example. 
For this research, data was collected only from academic sources to make sure only 
studies conducted in an equivalent manner are included. The data was gathered from two 
big academic article databases, EBSCO and ProQuest. These two were chosen for a num-
ber of reasons. One reason is that these academic source databases were available to the 
researcher. Another reason is that, even though only two academic source databases were 
used, they are among the largest academic journal databases in the world. The chosen 
databases have been ranked as number one and two on the University of Wisconsin-Mad-
ison library of top 10 databases (University of Wisconsin-Madison 2018). These two larg-
est databases have been selected alone because testing showed that adding smaller data-
bases would not produce any new, relevant data, as articles found in smaller databases 
were already included in the two databases that were chosen.  
In order to maintain the focus on the research question and the mechanisms, the data 
collection was conducted in the ProQuest as whole (Business database) and within EB-
SCO, in the EBSCO Business Source Complete. Tests were conducted to see whether the 
data from EBSCO Complete should be included, but it was discarded from this research 
due to low suitability for this research. EBSCO Complete is a database which covers all 
the data available in the database, including the data classified under EBSCO Business 
Source Complete. Most of the data generated from EBSCO Complete, which were not 
found from EBSCO Business Source Complete, covered areas such as cultural adaptation, 
spreading of diseases and language studies. Thus, EBSCO Complete was discarded as it 
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failed to offer added value compared to EBSCO Business Source Complete in this re-
search. Although ProQuest and EBSCO Business Source Complete were chosen as the 
databases for the data, no limitation to the field of the journals was made. Both databases 
include journals from various fields, giving the research a wider perspective on the topic. 
The data was collected from these two databases in the same way and on the same day. 
The final update to the data was made on the 11th of July 2018. This means the data 
collection period was limited to articles publishes in these two databases before this date. 
Another criterion was set for the time period of the articles to narrow down the most 
suitable articles for the data. The research question researches the mechanisms for a sys-
tem to resolve the issue of burden-sharing. As ‘the issue’ is understood as the aftermath 
of the refugee crisis of 2015, the time period was limited to articles published after 2015.  
To maintain the quality of the data and to narrow down the amount of data, only aca-
demic articles were chosen as data. In addition to this, the results were narrowed down to 
only peer-reviewed articles to ensure that only the most respected and trustworthy articles 
were included in the research. Due to language constraints, the data search was narrowed 
down to articles published in English or Finnish. No Finnish articles were found, and this 
criterion was discarded as ineffectual.  
After these parameters were in place, it was time to set the search words. The criteria 
for the search words were that (1) they should cover all possible articles that can address 
the research question, (2) they should not exclude any viable articles and (3) they should 
narrow down the results to an amount which is workable within this research. Some key 
search words were initially tested alone, but the results varied too much and there were 
too many articles. To narrow down and to find more suitable articles, key search words 
were combined. The key search words tested included ‘refugee’, ‘European Union’, ‘cri-
sis’, ‘EU’, ‘international’ and ‘Europe’. For this research, the two combined search words 
chosen were ‘refugee’ and ‘European Union’. The word ‘refugee’ was chosen, because it 
narrowed down the search to articles mostly covering this topic and the other search word, 
‘European Union’, was added to limit the search in a geographical way to the area where 
the recent crisis took place. The European Union was chosen as a region of focus because 
the recent refugee crisis has affected the region significantly and the European Union as 
a receiving region has been explored from many different angles offering me the chance 
to research existing theories from many perspectives.  
The search was conducted by using the Boolean search method with refugee AND 
European Union. The search was conducted in all parts of the text, title, key words and 
full text, meaning that both these words had to appear somewhere in the text but did not 
have to be in the title or the key words necessarily. After conducting a search using these 
parameters, EBSCO generated 415 articles and ProQuest 264, totalling 679 articles. 
These results were cross-referenced and after removing identical articles, 558 articles re-
mained in total. Figure 6 shows how the data collection phase moved forward.  
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Figure 6 Pyramid chart of the data collection process 
Figure 6 depicts a pyramid chart of the of narrowing down the data. After the initial 
search for data was completed, the data was sorted according to title and summaries to 
see whether the article covered the desired topic. Articles which remained in the search 
results but discussed topics which were not related to this research were discarded. These 
included articles that addressed different issues, for example, infectious diseases in refu-
gee populations or conditions in refugee camps. As figure 4 shows, 237 articles remained 
after the title and summary phase. The next phase was a closer examination of the articles. 
During this phase, 32 articles had to be discarded due to lack of availability from sources 
available to the researcher for this research. The remaining and available articles were all 
read through and during this process 52 articles were discarded because they did not ad-
dress the research question. These were articles that initially (title & summary) seemed 
indicate they discuss the issue but failed to do so. These were mostly articles which 
touched upon the subject, but were focused on an entirely different matter, for example a 
specific political person, article of a law or disease. These articles did not offer any pre-
requisites or methods and were therefore discarded.  
After reading all the articles and discarding the ones which did not address the subject 
of this thesis, the remaining 153 were examined and coded according to the codes ex-
plained in chapter 2.3. During the examination phase, an additional 94 articles had to be 
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discarded as not suitable and not addressing the research question (burden-sharing meth-
ods) of this thesis. These included, for example, articles which analysed the failings of 
the current system, but did not suggest any other methods/prerequisites or articles which 
were limited to analysing a specific non-related issue, such as the political environment. 
Articles were only included in the final set of the data if they could answer at least some 
of the questions posed in the coding frame, which will be explained in detail in the fol-
lowing chapter. In total 59 (see Annex 1) out of the initial 558 articles formed the final 
set of data.  
5.3 Building a coding frame and conducting a content analysis 
In this content analysis, academic journals were analysed using a qualitative content anal-
ysis method. The topic has been categorized into a coding frame and divided into codes 
which will be used to analyse the text. The building of a coding frame starts from a ‘wealth 
of material’, which has been gathered in the data collection phase. The coding frame sets 
out the main categories that the research focuses on. (Schreier 2012; 1, 58–59.) In this 
research, the focus is on burden-sharing mechanisms, the reasons and prerequisites for a 
system. The three main categories are then divided into subcategories of interest, which 
form the coding frame for the content analysis.  
A direct, concept-driven approach is used in this research, meaning that the coding 
frame has been derived from existing theory on international burden-sharing methods. 
The coding frame is derived from the classification of international burden-sharing mech-
anisms by Thielemann (2008,3). This theory has been selected because of its merits and 
popularity in the field of migration studies. Thielemann’s theory was also chosen because 
it reflects a theory from the time before the crisis and thus offers a view not based on the 
current crisis, but rather on a long-term study of the topic. The classification divides meth-
ods into one-dimensional and multi-dimensional mechanisms and each of these can be 
divided into hard or soft mechanisms, reaching a total of four core types of burden-sharing 
mechanisms (Thielemann 2008,3). The four subcategories for classifying the types of 
methods are hence as follows:  
• One-dimensional hard mechanisms 
• One-dimensional soft mechanisms 
• Multi-dimensional hard mechanism  
• Multi-dimensional soft mechanisms 
In addition, the following complimentary questions will be posed to the data collected:  
• Why should the issue be addressed?   
• What are the prerequisites for a working mechanism?  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The subcategories for the two complimentary questions was formed using a data-
driven way, because theory was not directly applicable, and a data-driven way offers the 
research more insight to the rich data. In a data-driven strategy, the subcategories for the 
main category are formed during the analysis process as they arise from the data (Schreir 
2012, 84–90). From the data collected, four subcategories emerged for both supporting 
research questions.  
The coding frame is built according to the prerequisites of a qualitative content analy-
sis expressed by Schreier (2012, 58–84), the key requirements being unidimensionality, 
mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness, to better ensure reliability and validity of the 
content analysis process. Unidimensionality is ensured when the categories each reflect 
only one aspect of the data, in this case burden-sharing methods, reasons and prerequi-
sites. Subcategories must reflect the main categories to guarantee proper analysis, in this 
research that means the subcategories for burden-sharing methods must be types of bur-
den-sharing methods. Mutual exclusiveness refers to the units of coding to be able to be 
classified under only one of the categories (Shreier 2012, 75). This is ensured in this re-
search by dividing the categories into three different questions that complement one an-
other, but the same answers cannot fit into more than one category. Exhaustiveness is 
referred to as the ability to assign each unit of coding to at least one subcategory (Schreier 
2012, 76). In this research, the main category of burden-sharing methods is based on 
Thielemann’s classification, which is inclusive and can categorize all types of methods. 
The exhaustiveness of the two other main categories is ensured by using a data-driven 
method to determine the subcategories.  
The coding frame was built using three dimensions and two hierarchical levels. The 
three dimensions are the three main categories and the two levels consist of the subcate-
gories. To ensure exhaustiveness, a level of YES/NO questions was added to each main 
category, as vital data could have been lost if the criteria were set to data which answered 
all three questions rather than to all the data which answers one or more of the questions. 
Each main category is thus divided into a first level of YES/NO, which refers to whether 
the data in hand addresses the issue, and if the answer is yes, the response the data gives 
is classified under one of the subcategories presented under the YES-option. Thus, taking 
into careful consideration the formation of the coding frame, the completed coding frame 
for this research is depicted in figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Coding frame for the analysed articles 
Figure 7 shows the coding frame in the form of a questionnaire. This coding frame 
questionnaire was then used to analyse the unit of analysis, which in this research consists 
of articles gathered in the data collection phase. Each article was analysed individually 
and the units of coding, which are according to Schreier (2012, 131), defined as the parts 
of the data which give the answer to the questions posed by the coding frame, were rec-
ognised, marked and coded. The articles were colour-coded: the reasons expressed in each 
article were highlighted in yellow, the prerequisites in green and the burden-sharing 
mechanisms in red. In addition to marking the units of coding in each article, also the 
units of context were analysed to fully comprehend the meaning of the units of coding. 
The units of context are the portion of data surrounding the units of coding, which enable 
the researcher to understand the material (Schreier 2012, 133). 



















• one-dimensional soft mechanisms
• one-dimensional hard mechanisms
• multi-dimensional soft mechanisms
• multi-dimensional hard mechanisms
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5.4 Evaluation of the study 
Evaluating a qualitative study is often complex. Since a qualitative method gives the re-
searcher more flexibility it also allows for more potential differences in interpretation. 
The most efficient way to overcome the problems qualitative methods can cause is to 
report the research, analysis and results as meticulously as possible. Since data-driven 
content analysis is flexible, the results and evaluation of this study can be affected by the 
researcher’s perceptions and interpretations of the data and the literature.   
Qualitative researches can be evaluated using different criteria. The trustworthiness of 
this research is evaluated by criteria developed by Lincoln and Guba (1985). The first 
criterion assessed is credibility, which can be built through prolonged engagement, trian-
gulation and persistent observation. This research made use of prolonged engagement and 
persistent observation as all articles studied were published during and after the crisis 
year 2015. The results were analysed through a burden-sharing theory developed before 
the crisis and the results were contrasted with the existing theory. The research was nar-
rowed down to the analysis of only academic articles, which inherently limits triangula-
tion opportunities. This research made use of two of the biggest academic databases, 
which contain the majority of published articles. This indicates that further triangulation 
to other databases would probably not have yielded different results, as these two data-
bases already produced 91 duplicates. On the other hand, further triangulation and broad-
ening the scope of the data to include, for example, interviews and analysis of institutional 
documents and meeting memos could yield interesting results.  
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), transferability of the research question is de-
fined as the ability to apply the results in another context. In this research, the studied 
area is very limited (the EU), but the criteria, and thus the research question, could be 
applied uniformly to any limited area. As this research focused on academic output mo-
tivated by the current crisis, the research question could be transferred to the neighbouring 
countries (for example Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) individually just as well. Transfer-
ability of the research question, though limited, exists in the area studied.  
Dependability is a criterion that assesses the consistency of the results and how well 
another researcher could generate the same results using the same data. In this research, 
dependability is quite high but faces certain restrictions due to the nature of the qualitative 
research method. For example, the coding process is very dependable, as the process is 
described meticulously and it is straightforward. The analysis of the unit of coding, on 
the other hand, is not as dependable since the perceptions of the researcher might affect 
the analysis and conclusions drawn from the data. By recording and clearly demonstrating 
how and why things were analysed the way they were, this research seeks ensure depend-
ability. The results have been presented in a way that allows for both supportive and un-
supportive arguments to be voiced.  
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The last criterion mentioned by Lincoln and Guba (1985) is confirmability. Confirm-
ability is the analysis of the credibility of the sources of data. In this research, it means 
understanding and analysing the articles and the background to them and assessing the 
credibility of the articles. As previously mentioned in the data collection phase, careful 
attention was paid to safeguard the credibility of the data. Thus, only peer-reviewed aca-
demic articles were included in the data collection process. This ensures better confirma-
bility of the results. However, as this research was conducted partly in the form of a data-
driven content analysis, it must be taken into consideration that the interpretations made 
by the researcher might affect the findings. This research aims at voicing the data, thus 
carefully analysing the articles to include all the messages conveyed by them and to re-
frain from overanalysing the articles. All in all, this study adheres to the trustworthiness 
criteria expressed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) fairly well by addressing the issues of 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. The results of this research 
can therefore be valued as acceptably trustworthy.  
However, there are some limitations to the study. Firstly, as the 2015 crisis has been a 
predominant driver for research of various EU-oriented methods, the research focused on 
the EU’s point of view. The articles analysed were all in English, which might contribute 
to an Anglo-Saxon analysis of the issue. On the other hand, English is the predominant 
language of international research, so the results of this content analysis would probably 
not differ markedly even if multiple languages were added as search criteria.  
Secondly, though the availability of the data used is respectable, new researches are 
conducted constantly, meaning the data grows as we speak. A bigger pool of data offers 
more possibilities but at the same time limits the use of the findings of this research in the 
long run, as they become a mere snippet of all the studies related to the issue published 
post 2015. As only peer-reviewed articles were used as data for this research, it limits the 
possibilities of alternative suggestions proposed in other forums. Though this study is 
limited to the academics of the issue, alternative forums could offer more innovative so-
lutions desperately called for by academics.  
Thirdly and lastly, emphasis must be placed on the analysis of the transparency of the 
chosen analysis method. While the data coding process is easy to describe and account 
for, thus being easily replicable, the analysis process is more complex. Content analysis 
is aimed at producing a holistic view rather than a deep understanding of a very specific 
subject. This means that a deep analysis of each suggested method is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Instead, it focuses on reframing new suggestions within the existing theory 
and comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences of the methods.  
 The researcher has no ties or linkages to any refugees or institutions and thus examines 
the problem from a purely academic perspective as an outsider. Thus, it can be argued 
that the position of the researcher does not present any major bias on the study. This 
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ensures objectivity in the analysis of the results. It should be noted, though, that the aca-
demic world can sometimes be considered too theoretical for real-life solutions and thus 
the findings might suffer from a lack of institutional realism. 
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6 REASONS FOR ADDRESSING THE ISSUE 
6.1 The 2015 crisis 
The content analysis demonstrated that the 2015 crisis has been a major driver for change 
and examining possible alternative methods of addressing the issue. Although this was 
somewhat expected since the study was conducted on research papers published after the 
crisis, the predominance of the 2015 crisis as the motivation for the studies was stronger 
than expected. This was demonstrated by the vast amount of references to the crisis: 58 
out of 59 articles studied mentioned the 2015 crisis in context as the motivation for the 
study. Very often the articles mentioned the 2015 crisis in the very first sentences, most 
often already in the abstract.  
An interesting observation made on the basis of the articles is that not all articles agreed 
that 2015 should be called a year of crisis or, in general, a migrant crisis. For example, 
Morsut and Kruke (2017, 145) referred to the situation as a ‘so-called 2015 migrant and 
refugee crisis in Europe’. The term crisis is certainly contested in academic literature, 
even though all articles concurred that the current situation has been particularly different 
to preceding years. The articles demonstrated that the year 2015 should not be considered 
a ‘one-off’ and maybe that it is the reason it should not necessarily be called the 2015 
crisis. Some authors, such as Carlsen (2017, 1148) and Stenschke (2017, 91), noted that 
the current situation is only the beginning and might even be the new normal, as possible 
future waves of refugees and migrants make their way to Europe. Dustmann et al. (2017, 
534) concurred with the idea of the 2015 crisis being only a prelude and suggested that 
future migration and asylum seeker waves will come from Africa and the Middle East 
due to their vastly growing population and risk of conflict in the regions. 
It could be clearly concluded from the articles that the 2015 crisis, or better referred to 
as the changed circumstances of 2015, sparked a new interest in the field of migration 
and refugee burden-sharing studies. The year 2015 has acted as a catalyst for innovative 
and alternative research, as the articles demonstrated. There is no clear-cut and simple 
answer to this question, and the suggestions made in the articles that were analysed varied 
from one extreme to the other, even though they all based their reasoning on the same 
situation. This only goes to show that the problem is clearly recognized and all parties 
seem to be in agreement that it needs a solution, just that the answers are very different. 
The 2015 crisis was, as expected, the common denominator for all the articles studied.          
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6.2 Flaws in the current mechanism 
As expected, the 2015 crisis was a common denominator in almost all of the articles stud-
ied. Another common denominator that was anticipated was basing the reasoning on the 
flaws or inadequacies in the current system, the CEAS. This was expected because often 
change is due when the existing system is deemed inadequate. Criticisms of the current 
system were predominantly present in most articles, but surprisingly not all articles that 
reasoned their study on the basis of the 2015 crisis criticized the current method as un-
workable.  
Thym (2016, 1546) noted that the 2015 crisis has revealed ‘structural deficiencies’ in 
the current mechanism and such a system will not be able to cope with future waves of 
refugees and migrants. On the contrary, the CEAS was often seen as an appropriate 
method for its time, but the changing future requires a changed method. Structural defi-
ciencies were referred to in many articles, mainly within the concept of fair and realistic 
distribution. For example, Carlsen (2017, 1148), Angenendt et al. (2016, 29) and An-
geloni and Spano (2018, 477) note that the current mechanism is unfair, and the system 
should aim at greater sharing of responsibility. Unfair distribution due to geographical 
location is a major issue and geography should not be the only driver in distributing ref-
ugees (Carlsen 2017, 1148). Türk (2016, 57) calls the current system a ‘crisis of account-
ability and solidarity’ system. Most of the critique was addressed at the so-called Dublin 
Regulation I–IV. It was seen as the source of inequitable distribution and burden-sharing 
in the EU, because it defines the state responsible according to first entry, which is often 
linked with geography (Jones & Teytelboym 2016, 80). A concrete example of the inad-
equacy of the Dublin Regulation was when German Chancellor Angela Merkel tempo-
rarily suspended the Dublin Regulation in August 2015 in Germany (Fullerton 2016, 
130). 
As Dublin Regulations were built to even out the distribution of refugees in the EU 
through the relocation method, it was in fact designed to address the issue of unequal 
burdens. This relocation scheme also faces heavy criticism, as the Commission itself has 
reported that only 25 percent of planned relocations have been executed. (Niemann & 
Zaun 2018, 7). Perusel (2015, 134) concurs and adds that as long as there is a lack of 
solidarity the Dublin system will not work. Hansen and Randeira (2018, 994) assess that 
the Dublin system cannot work under the current area of free movement.  
Some articles gave heavy critique to the current system as ‘failing itself, failing refu-
gees and failing humanity’ (Van Selm 2016, 60). The failings, especially when it comes 
to the human rights aspect of the current system, were referenced multiple times (see for 
example Fullerton 2016, 57; Collet 2016, 40; Hatton 2017, 449). The outlook on the hu-
man rights issues varied. Hatton (2017, 449) suggests that the current system encourages 
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people to make ‘hazardous maritime or overland crossings’ and critiques that the current 
system cannot provide a prospect of gaining refugee status before taking this trip. 
Fullerton (2016, 57), on the other hand, criticizes the differences in the national asylum 
systems and conditions, which vary between Member States. Human rights issues were 
also referenced in the cases of the policy on non-refoulement (principle on the returns of 
refugees and asylum seekers) and the categorization of ‘safe countries of origin’. These 
issues are not further discussed in this research as they are outside the scope of this thesis, 
because they are related to situations when a refugee status is not granted, and asylum is 
denied. 
6.3 Addressing megatrends 
6.3.1 Economic issues 
Interestingly, the 2015 crisis and the flaws in the current system were not the only reasons 
for addressing the issue. A general consensus in the articles studied was that the issue is 
not one of a kind and the future might look a lot different than the past. This is why other 
reasons for addressing the issue also arose. Through the data-driven coding process, 
where the units of analysis formed the final coding frame, megatrends such as economic 
and environmental issues as well as demographic changes rose as a category for reasons 
for addressing the issue. 
Economic issues were often seen as a way to address the root problem in the countries 
of origin (see for example Agenendt et al. 2016, 29 and Stenschke 2017, 94). Dustmann 
et al. (2017, 534) noted that ‘less than average economic development’ can be a root cause 
for future refugee migration waves. Problems in economic developments were seen as 
root causes especially for asylum seekers, who might in the end be denied asylum and 
labelled as economic migrants.  
Economic issues could also be addressed from the other side of the table, from the 
perspective of EU funding. Tudor (2015), for example, saw the flaws in the current fund-
ing schemes as a reason to change the system or the funding of the system. EU funding 
spent on prevention of refugee migration should not only be aimed at solving the direst 
situations but also focus on the economic gaps between less developed and developed 
countries. Issues that could be addressed through EU financing could be poverty, govern-
ance, jobs, peace, security and human rights, for example. Addressing these issues pre-
emptively could lower the pressure to relocate and apply for asylum in the EU. (Tudor 
2015, 74). 
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6.3.2 Environmental issues 
A noteworthy result from the content analysis is that environmental refugees were also 
mentioned (Carlsen 2017, 1148). The term environmental refugee is a difficult concept, 
because international law recognizes refugees as people who face ‘well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion’ (Geneva convention 1951). As one can note, environ-
mental issues are not within the scope of the definition. Thus, ‘environmental refugee’ 
does not yet exist in international law, but perhaps the increasing use and need for the 
term could be a driver for reconsidering the definition of a refugee. Katz (2017, 303) 
suggests that the definition of a refugee should be clarified due to the lack of consistency 
in the handling of asylum applications within the EU. The variability of implementation 
is also noted by Türk (2016, 57) as a problem.  
Other researchers refer to the same issue of Carlsen’s definition of an environmental 
refugee (a person seeking asylum due to environmental issues in his/her country of origin) 
as the problem of mounting migration due to environmental reasons. Benedikter (2017; 
445, 458) notes that mass migration from Africa to Europe should be addressed by aiding 
African nations’ development to a more sustainable level, environmentally, economically 
and politically. Angenendt et al. (2016, 29) also note that climate change is a driver for 
migration in developing countries, and climate change mitigation can provide solutions 
to the issue. Angeloni & Spano (2018, 474) and Dustmann et al. (2017, 534) mention 
climate change and global warming as a possible reason for future migratory waves. 
6.3.3 Demographic changes 
Demographic changes were brought up as a reason for addressing the issue, as the popu-
lation of the world is expected to increase, especially in Africa and the Middle East. The 
UN’s World Population Prospects estimates that the total population of the world will 
increase by over 1.1 billion persons by 2035. The population increase is mainly expected 
to be in the less developed regions of the world, where the population is estimated to grow 
by 1 billion. (United Nations 2018.) As can be seen from the data, the general population 
growth is concentrated in areas from where people make the move to the EU to seek 
asylum.  
Even if the Syrian war were to eventually end, Brenke (2015, 22) expects that the 
asylum seeker flows will not decrease because the population is growing at such a high 
rate. Rapid population growth increases economic and environmental issues especially in 
less developed countries, particularly in Africa, where countries are already facing tre-
mendous population growth – leading to people seeking asylum and basic needs in other 
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parts of the world, including the EU. As a general observation, it can me noted that 
throughout history high population growth also often triggers internal conflicts, which 
again contributes to asylum seeker flows. (Brenke 2015.) 
6.4 From security and integration issues to discourse challenges 
For the most part, the articles referred to the earlier-mentioned reasons for addressing the 
issue. Some additional reasons were given during the analysis process, but they were not 
significant enough to form individual categories. These included issues such as upholding 
Union values (Emiliani 2017, 27), rule of law issues (Emiliani 2017, 27; Angenendt et al. 
2016, 30) and the crisis of European integration (Bauböck 2018, 141).  
Security and terrorist threats, which are often present in the media, were also men-
tioned in some articles. Angenendt et al. (2016, 30) noted that internal security of the EU 
is a reason to address the issue and Metzel and Lorenzen (2017, 51) noted that security 
and terrorist threats should be taken into account, as criminal organisations take advantage 
of the refugee population inside the EU. Bagdonas (2017, 20–26) argues that the only 
way to guarantee the security of the EU is to remain together and integrated, as escalated 
disagreements lead to Member States using their sovereign power to erect walls and close 
borders.  
Another noteworthy reason to address the problem was to change the discourse of asy-
lum seeking and refuge. El-Enany (2015, 8–9) argues that history, especially European 
history, shows that moving to another country when faced with persecution, poverty or 
other reasons has always been the norm. In fact, implementing immigration controls in 
Europe is a fairly new standard. The current discourse on sovereign national states with 
immigration control limits the ‘emergence of any alternative to restriction’, and thus re-
searching other options becomes restricted. (El-Enany 2015, 8–9.) Other researches such 
as Stenschke (2017, 94) also brought up history as an example of non-restrictive migra-
tion policies. Nearly a quarter of a million French Hugenots sought asylum in Europe 
before and after 1685. Instead of burdening host countries, they made economic contri-
butions and benefitted the receiving areas. (Stenschke 2017, 94.) Hansen and Randeira 
(2018, 994) note that currently non-restrictive policies are welcomed more generally by 
universities and businesses.  
Even though the analysis showed that the 2015 crisis is indeed a catalyst for research 
and a common denominator, the reasons for addressing the issue vary considerably. It can 
be concluded that the 2015 crisis has acted as a lighter to spark present-day research, but 
the underlying reasons for the need to address the issue are much more heterogenic, var-
ying from dealing with megatrends to security issues and to changing the discourse from 
46 
problem-oriented to opportunity-oriented. The next chapter, in turn, will analyse the pre-
requisites proposed for a working method. 
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7 PREREQUISITES FOR THE SYSTEM 
The next item in the coding frame was prerequisites for a system. Unlike the reasons 
where a common denominator could be found, the prerequisites varied a lot. Not surpris-
ingly, because prerequisites are often linked to the suggestions of a working method, and 
different methods require different circumstances. In this section, the analysis was fo-
cused on the general prerequisites proposed, rather than the specific detailed prerequisites 
of each proposed mechanism, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The prerequi-
sites that arose from the coding of the articles were subcategorized into four categories: 
border control, supranational governance, burden-sharing schemes and other prerequi-
sites. The prerequisites that were found in the coding phase were gathered and analysed 
and they formed, according to their frequency, the above-mentioned subcategories. 
7.1 Border control  
Border control, in particular, was a very controversial prerequisite, some arguing for strict 
border control and some for banishing border control altogether. Hatton (2017, 474–475), 
for example, argues for border control to be enforced and tightened in order for any sys-
tem to function. The need for enforced border control is argued to ‘limit the policy back-
lash arising from public concerns’ and to please the public opinion. It is also argued to be 
a feasible solution on a practical level and the ‘successful’ border control efforts made by 
Australia were referenced. (Hatton 2017; 474, 479; Ayre 2016). The strict border control 
of Australia has indeed been successful in minimizing irregular maritime arrivals, but it 
has been financially tremendously expensive to maintain (Ayre 2016, 77).  
Many articles also argued for enforced border control in order to mitigate crime and 
smuggling (see for example Tudor 2015, 74; Stavropoulou 2016, 7). Border control is 
seen as justified in mitigating human smuggling, because stronger, enforced and stricter 
border control decreases the marker for human smuggling as the probability of reaching 
the EU decreases. This has also been used to argue the case for the Australian no-boat 
entry immigration policy (Ayre 2016, 77.) Stavropoulou (2016, 7) believes that ‘protec-
tion-sensitive border control’ is not possible and suggests that the only way to combat 
crime and smuggling is by means of enforced sea border control. However, Stavropoulou 
(2016, 7) notes that these actions in the case of the Mediterranean are often illegal ac-
cording to EU law. Enforced border control has also been linked to the darkest times in 
European history (Menendez 2016, 416). Thus, enforced border control, even if efficient, 
might not be a viable option.  
An opposing way to combat human smuggling and to decrease black-market demand 
would be to provide legal pathways to the EU. This could be done, for example, by issuing 
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humanitarian visas of the kind issued by Brazil. These are visas which allow asylum seek-
ers to enter the country legally to apply for asylum. Legal travel opportunities would de-
crease the market for illegal routes. Another approach is the one often referred to as the 
UK model, which insists that refugees are selected from refugee camps from outside the 
EU and then relocated within the EU. In order for this method to be successful, the relo-
cation rates should be high enough to discourage people from trying to enter the EU ille-
gally. However, the current relocation rates do not encourage asylum seekers to remain 
in camps outside the EU. (Costello 2016, 13.) 
Tinker (2016, 411) offers a midway path to border control, by suggesting that firstly 
the asylum seeker and immigration screening procedures should be better harmonized 
and implemented on an EU level, rather than Member States deciding independently 
whether to keep their borders open or to close them. A centralized screening location 
could also be a part of a solution for a working system (Tinker 2016, 411). Van Selm 
(2016, 62) also offers a less polarized view by suggesting that border control be left to 
the level of national decision-making and could be addressed by bilateral and multilateral 
agreements with neighbouring countries.  
The border control issue is polarized, with some arguing for closing the borders and 
some insisting on keeping them open or even granting more ways of entering the EU 
legally. Both aim at the same result of solving the refugee and asylum-seeker issue but 
address it from very different angles. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that nei-
ther enforced nor a more open border control policy is an absolute prerequisite for a work-
ing system, as either can be argued for and against. In addition, the current border control 
system also seems to be a possibility. The varied results show that the general significance 
of border control is minor, even though it can be incremental for a specific proposed 
method.  
7.2 Supranational governance 
The analysis of the articles clearly illustrated that some sort of common governance is 
needed as a prerequisite for a working system (see for example Bauböck 2018; Dustmann 
et al. 2017; Fisseha 2017; Tinker 2016; Hatton 2017). In this section of the analysis, all 
the suggestions of above-national level governance were taken into account. The sugges-
tions varied from bilateral agreements to EU-level governance and to global governance. 
A common denominator for the prerequisites of a working system was found in suprana-
tional governance, as most articles suggested some sort of supranational governance as a 
prerequisite for the methods suggested. The Eurobarometer 2015 results support the 
claim, as EU level governance for asylum and migration issues was supported by 72.6 
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percent of people who agreed that refugees should be more evenly distributed within the 
EU (Eurobarometer 2015). 
Not all articles argued for a supranational governance per se but for deeper harmoni-
sation of common policies, which effectively is EU-level governance. For example, An-
geloni & Spano (2018, 481) note that a prerequisite for a functioning method requires 
‘deeper harmonizing of procedures and standards across countries’. The requirement of 
harmonization is linked to the difference in country-specific push and pull factors. In 
some Member States asylum claims are processed 5 times faster than in others, the right 
to work whilst waiting for a decision also varies between Member States. In addition, the 
quality of the reception conditions is not homogenous between Member States. These are 
all qualities of unharmonized policies, which lead to differentiated asylum flows between 
Member States. (Angeloni & Spano 2018, 479–481.) Fullerton (2016, 132), van Selm 
(2016, 60) and Brenke (2016, 522) support policy harmonization and argue that asylum 
law should be applied uniformly to ensure a common response.  
To be able to maintain an equal and fair sharing of the burden, one Member State 
should not be perceived as more or less attractive than others, because it only increases 
secondary movement to the preferred Member States, effectively nulling the effects of a 
relocation or burden-sharing mechanism. Dustmann et al. (2017, 532) also argue that 
cost-savings of hosting asylum seekers could be found through cooperation between 
countries, especially when it comes to integrating refugees into the host community. 
Thus, policy harmonization is a crucial prerequisite. On the other hand, too much harmo-
nization can come at the cost of effective national policies. Tinker (2016, 411–412) notes 
that Member States should be given the right to organize job training, culture and lan-
guage classes in whichever way they find most suitable. Kucuk (2016, 469) as well sug-
gests that the system should be developed into a centralized scheme, where all applica-
tions jointly processed. Finding a solution or agreeing on supranational governance seems 
to be more difficult by the day, and Havlova and Tamchynova (2016, 101) call for inno-
vative measures to ingrate all Member States into the decision-making process, taking 
into account the national polarization of politics and divisions in opinions.  
Morsut and Kruke (2017, 156) take a more subtle approach and conclude that there is 
a need for common governance, but in order to reach a conclusion on it, the efforts should 
be focused on crisis characterization and common measures that would be activated when 
a crisis hits. This gives Member States the right to organize policies nationally in most 
cases but mandate them to follow supranational agreements (EU-level) in cases of crisis. 
Morsut and Kruke (2017, 157) suggest that the crisis characterization is agreed upon on 
an intergovernmental level and the measures are taken by supranational institutions, such 
as the European Commission for example.   
A crisis-activated supranational approach was also suggested by Fisseha (2017, 52), 
who suggested that the current refugee crisis is an international responsibility and thus 
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should be governed from a global level. Fisseha (2017, 52) suggests that the appropriate 
governing body could be a collaboration between states, international organisations and 
NGOs. This is to ensure a holistic approach to the problem (Fisseha 2017). Tudor (2015, 
72) supports the idea of involving global players and suggests that the UNHCR could act 
as an auditor, and check all applications rejected by Member States to ensure international 
procedure compliance. Involving global-scale players into the governing body is a logical 
idea but faces heavy criticism as international bodies have minimal power over the Mem-
ber States or even the European Union as a whole. Accountability and compliance is hard 
to enforce if needed. Some support for the activation of the Temporary Protection Di-
rective was also found (Ineli-Ciger 2016). Since the Directive would require a political 
agreement to be activated, is it not necessarily seen as a viable option. On the other hand, 
Panobianco and Fontana (2018, 13) conclude that temporary protection might just be the 
golden path to which all Member States can politically agree.  
Supranational governance was not always proposed for the asylum policies alone. 
Governance could be focused on common external partnerships and common external 
border control. A common approach to partnerships with third countries regarding asylum 
and migration procedures is enshrined in the Treaty of the Functioning EU Art. 79(3), 
which states that the EU should manage its asylum and migration flows in cooperation 
with third countries. Engaging in partnerships with third countries is an efficient way of 
addressing the problem before it creates problems inside EU borders. For example, the 
EU-Turkey deal can be seen as such an agreement. The effectiveness of these agreements 
is limited within the EU due to free movement inside the Schengen area whilst some 
countries still seem more attractive to asylum seekers. It is even argued that the external 
policies for migration are only in place because free movement inside the Schengen area 
requires external borders to be effectively protected with common regulation. On the 
other hand, the EU does not have any further legal powers to engage in external activities 
and is bound by budgetary and institutional constraints when it comes to new external 
policies. (Emiliani 2017, 23–27.) 
External actions with third countries could also be used in an economic way to improve 
the economic situation of refugees and asylum seekers. Bin Talal (2016, 79) argues that 
bilateral agreements could be useful: for example, trade and manufacturing agreements 
to help refugees in the country of origin to manufacture and export to the EU via bilateral 
agreements. This would then decrease the need to make the journey to the EU, especially 
for those asylum seekers who are later identified as economic immigrants.  
As the study conducted by Perusel (2015, 133) demonstrated, the asylum and refugee 
policies and interpretation of EU policies is on ‘a fragile trend towards’ more harmoniza-
tion, further efforts are still needed to form a base for a working system. The research 
analysis showed that supranational governance is strongly supported, and it is a common 
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denominator for all suggested systems. The problem seems to lie in how to implement 
supranational governance, whether it be on a global, EU level or bilateral. 
7.3 Burden-sharing 
Another subcategory of prerequisites which emerged from the data was prerequisites for 
distributing and sharing the burden. It was obvious from the outset that burden-sharing 
would emerge as one of the prerequisites since this study is focused on burden-sharing 
mechanisms. As previously discussed, the concept of burden is not homogenous and is 
understood and calculated differently. From the content analysis, it can be concluded that 
a prerequisite for a working burden-sharing method is that the burden is shared. 
Angeloni and Spano (2018, 478) suggest that a burden-sharing mechanism could only 
ever work if it was mandatory. This is because voluntary approaches offer Member States 
the possibility and temptation to deviate from commonly agreed policies. Member States 
are particularly tempted to use their inherent push and pull factors to regulate their flows 
of asylum seekers. Member States with more attractive asylum procedures have revised 
their migration legislation and border control policies, as in the case of Belgium, Den-
mark, France and Sweden. (Angeloni & Spano 2018, 477–479.) Mandatory schemes of 
burden-sharing would not permit Member States to differentiate their procedures and leg-
islation. It seems that voluntary measures permit too much national differentiation and 
thus slow down and hinder burden-sharing initiatives. 
Jones and Teytelboym (2016, 81) address the issue of the wealth of the ‘burden’ and 
conclude that a working system requires the EU to accept ‘enormous flows of refugees’ 
to resolve the current situation. Bin Talal (2016, 78) argues that the EU’s resources as a 
whole are more than enough to host the people fleeing from the Middle East, but it re-
quires the Member States to share the responsibility of hosting refugees. Currently, the 
distribution of refugees between Member States is still very uneven (Roberts et al. 2016, 
3). According to Bauböck (2018, 141), the sharing of the burden should be done in a 
manner that aims to maximize the number of refugees who receive protection.  
In addition, several articles (see for example Perusel 2015; van Selm 2016; Fullerton 
2016) noted that a prerequisite for sharing the burden is policy harmonization or enforced 
supranational governance. The Dublin system, for example, was built as a method of 
sharing the burden but it will never fulfil its duty if there is a lack of solidarity and policies 
differ within Member States (Perusel 2015, 134; van Selm 2016, 60). Nancheva (2015, 
451) corcurs and adds that the CEAS has been the primary obstruction to addressing the 
pressures in countries such as Greece and Italy.  
The analysis of the articles shows that there is a need for burden sharing. The current 
situation does not seem to satisfy anyone. The Eurobarometer, at the peak of the crisis in 
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2015, supports this claim, as 73.3 percent of all those who participated in the question-
naire felt that the burden must be shared more equally within the EU (Eurobarometer 
2015). 
7.4 Long-term and external plans 
Most articles clearly focused on the above-mentioned prerequisites, but some other pre-
requisites emerged from the content analysis. Long-term plans were advocated because 
the current situation was seen as a complex and not necessarily a one-off (Zodian 2015, 
302). Roberts et al. (2016, 2) took a more hands-on approach and noted that practicalities 
such as language barriers, trust issues and cultural differences should be taken into ac-
count if a new method is to work. 
As already mentioned in the preceding sections, the restlessness and crisis in the Mid-
dle East has been seen as a major contributor to the issue. Some saw it as too big of a 
problem to only address from within the EU and thus a prerequisite for a new mechanism 
should be that the reasons for migration should be addressed in the countries of origin. 
The EU should through its external actions be involved in ensuring peace, political stabi-
lization and economic development in the countries of origin. (Roberts et al. 2016 ,4; 
Tudor 2015, 66). 
External actions should be focused on alleviating the push factors for migration and 
the EU should focus on the root causes of migration, rather than negotiating bilateral 
agreements with third countries on returns and migration control. Strong cooperation and 
involvement of third countries is supported as the EU cannot act alone in the Middle East 
and Africa. A long-term plan should be focused on the root causes of displacement as 
well as address the crisis situation of the moment. (Population & Development Review 
2016, 582–583.) After a thorough analysis of the reasons for addressing the issue as well 
as the prerequisites for a working system, the next chapters will focus on the analysis of 
the different suggested methods for a burden-sharing system.  
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8 ALTERNATIVE BURDEN-SHARING MECHANISMS 
8.1 Alternative one-dimensional solutions 
As previously described, one-dimensional mechanisms are mechanisms which take into 
account only one dimension, for example the number of refugees. One-dimensional hard 
mechanisms can be for example, binding rules or distributive quotas while one-dimen-
sional soft mechanism can be pledging systems or temporary protection. The content 
analysis showed that one-dimensional mechanisms are a possible solution to the issue.  
8.1.1 Discourse shift 
The results showed that the problem is more widely researched than basic burden-sharing 
mechanisms give reason to believe. Some mechanisms focused on the problem of the 
refugee crisis paradigm. Del Re (2017, 160) notes that the issue should be primarily ad-
dressed through a paradigm shift from a problem-oriented scope to an opportunities-ori-
ented scope. This means asylum seekers and migration in general would be understood 
in a larger context. The migration issue should be seen as an opportunity to address the 
ageing populations of Europe and other demographic shortcomings. Asylum seeking 
should be seen as one form of migration and migrants should be evaluated individually 
and, contrary to the current understanding, could have more than one motive for migrating 
to Europe. For example, a person could be an asylum seeker as well as an economic mi-
grant. (Del Re 2017, 159–163.) 
The general shift of the paradigm would be aided by multilateral arrangements with 
countries of origin and countries of transit. The study also suggests that ‘circulation mi-
gration’ should be taken into account fundamentally in the new system. Circulation mi-
gration is the idea that migrants, be they asylum seekers or other migrants, often have the 
general aspiration to emigrate back to their country of origin. In addition, many send 
remittances to their country of origin, thus contributing to the country of origin’s economy 
rather than the host countries. (Del Re 2017, 159–163.) 
Shifting the paradigm and the conversation from problem-orientated to opportunity- 
orientated might be crucial in the long run, but the paradigm shift method fails to address 
the current issue of burden-sharing. What should be done in cases where the asylum seek-
ers do not fit into any of the Member States demographic shortcomings? Elderly people 
could generally be thought to mainly generate costs to the host countries as they do not 
participate actively in the labour market. These kinds of asylum seekers are not addressed 
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in the paradigm shift model and it lacks a comprehensive perspective on the overall issue 
as well as practical advice for policy makers. 
The shift in the focus of the discourse was supported in multiple articles. For example, 
El-Enany (2015, 37–38) notes that the current discourse contributes and supports the cur-
rent restrictive migration regimes of the EU. Alternatives to border control cannot be dis-
cussed when the discourse revolves around protectionism. The issue should be seen from 
a broader historical perspective, which shows that movement of people has been a histor-
ical norm since the beginning of mankind (El-Enany 2015, 37–38). This can be seen as a 
quest to find alternative non-restrictive methods to solve the issue. Stavropoulou (2016, 
9) and Hatton (2017) recognize the restrictions in the current discourse as well. Refugee-
hosting is a public good and thus should not be approached through restriction (Hatton 
2017). Verme (2016) brings up the lack of research, especially in economics, on the sub-
ject. Studies on the economics of forced migration can improve the targeting of pro-
grammes and theoretically test alternative policies (Verme 2016, 160-161). It is even ar-
gued that economic theory proves that limitless cross-border migration is a requirement 
for maximising global GDP, as it works in a similar way to free trade by maximising 
overall wealth (Straubhaar 2015, 238). 
8.1.2 Redistributive quotas 
One suggested one-dimensional method was to build a working hypothesis around an 
annual quota for refugees in Europe. This means calculating how many refugees of all 
the existing refugees Europe can host as a whole. This number would then be used as a 
planning tool to organize reception and processing capacities in Europe to match the 
global quota of refugees. (Stavropoulou 2016, 8.) Stavropoulou (2016, 8) already noted 
that a quota can only be used as an indicative tool, since actual refugee quotas are not 
allowed under international law. Redistributive quotas are a hard, one-dimensional mech-
anisms, but this could also be considered as a soft, one-dimensional mechanism, as there 
are no enforced obligations for Member States to comply to an indicative Europe-wide 
refugee quota. 
Another way redistributive quotas can be used is through resettlement and relocation 
schemes. These can redistribute refugees from camps in countries of first entry (such as 
Turkey and Lebanon) or from one Member State to another. Redistribution from areas 
closer to the origin of refugees, such as Turkey and Lebanon, are initiatives to try and 
clamp down on the human smuggling market and to guarantee a legal way to the EU. On 
the other hand, redistributing refugees from one Member State to another is a burden-
sharing mechanism which directly moves a part of the burden from one Member State to 
another. If the redistribution in either case is mandatory, it can be categorized as a one-
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dimensional hard mechanism. If, on the other hand, it is not based on imperatives, it can 
be seen as a one-dimensional soft mechanism. The hypothetical, indicative European ref-
ugee quota suggested by Stavropoulou (2016, 9) could be introduced into the dialogue to 
ease the process of agreeing on a mandatory resettlement scheme, which could be based 
on the indicative ‘refugee quota’.  
Redistributive and resettlement quotas were a trend in the articles analysed. Imperative 
distribution can be carried out in different ways. Jones and Teytelboym (2016, 80) pro-
pose that the redistribution be constructed in a matching model. This way both the hosting 
county and the refugee can express their opinion. This matching system could take into 
account the total amount of refugees, the preferences expressed by the Member States 
and the preferences of the refugee. The preferences of the hosting Member States could 
be linked to skills gaps, cultural issues such as language or religion, or population com-
position. (Jones & Teytelboym 2016, 80.) European demographic problems were men-
tioned more than once, and the refugee crisis was seen as a possible way to address the 
issue (see for example Zodian 2015, Brenke 2015, Hansen & Randeria 2018) This in turn 
would incentivize hosting countries to receive more refugees. Hansen and Randeria 
(2018, 995) note that even though Europe desperately needs migration, the current polit-
ical situation does allow for sufficient migration or refugees. Nicolaescu and Petre (2017, 
561) argue that the relocation areas should be carefully analysed to ensure refugees are 
not socially excluded, as it often leads to security issues in the host community, as men-
tioned earlier in this paper.  
In addition, a matching system does not take into account the theoretically possible 
(EU population subtracted from the world population) vast number of refugees. Even if 
the number of refugees is not close to this, it can almost double the population of the EU 
and, as previously mentioned, it can be debated whether the EU is capable of hosting vast 
numbers of refugees. In theory, this could be combined with the above-mentioned theo-
retical European refugee quota to set a ceiling to the number of refugees. Hansen and 
Randeira (2018, 995) do not mention a European quota but estimate that Europe could 
accept between 25 and 50 percent of the world’s refugees. Kugiel (2016, 56–58) is the 
only one to stress the importance of forced returns in case of crisis as a solution to limiting 
the number of people who enter the EU.  
8.1.3 Military aid and border control 
Restrictive mechanisms can also be seen as a one-dimensional hard mechanism since they 
address one dimension, in this case again the number of refugees. Restrictive measures 
try to reduce the number of refugees that need to be hosted in the EU. Restriction can be 
put in place at different stages of the process in different ways. Border control can be seen 
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as a restrictive measure, since it is often aimed at restricting the entry of asylum seekers 
into the EU. Other suggested ways of restricting the entry of asylum seekers into the EU 
are assisting Turkey in hosting the current asylum seekers and refugees to discourage 
further movement, training for EU border countries in security-screen admitted people 
and to support Mediterranean efforts in limiting the number of crossings across the sea. 
(Metzel & Lorenzen 2017, 61–63).  
These restrictive methods are reasoned by potential security threats, the smuggling 
market and the EU’s capacity to host refugees. Metzel and Lorenzen (2017, 51–52) base 
their proposals for military intervention in Turkey, Greece and the Mediterranean on the 
understanding that they are methods which have worked before. They do so by referenc-
ing the Bosnian (1992–95) and Kosovo (1999) crises, which both involved military inter-
vention in the end. No other articles showed support for military interventions even 
though critical views of the EU’s capacity were expressed. On the other hand, as previ-
ously discussed in the prerequisites chapter, some consider the EU to be more than capa-
ble of handling the number of refugees currently seeking refuge. The closest supporting 
arguments for military interventions were arguments for enforced border control and ex-
ternalization of the problem (see Tudor 2015, 74; Stavropoulou 2016, 7; Hatton 2017, 
474–475). 
8.1.4 Financial methods 
Whilst one-dimensional mechanisms are often seen as mechanisms that assign a number 
of refugees to Member States and do not partake in initiatives of exchange of financial 
aid or other aspects, Angeloni and Spano (2018, 483) note that a study conducted by 
Millbank in 2001 has produced results in stemming migration flows by improving condi-
tions in the source regions. This is seen in popular terms as the ‘throw money at the prob-
lem’ solution, and although some results have been achieved, one can note from the 2015 
crisis that some crises are too unpredictable to be addressed beforehand from the outside. 
Though this one-dimensional aid-based mechanism has not been the current solution 
to the problem, it has been a part of the actions the EU has taken. The EU-Turkey State-
ment in March 2016 can be seen as such an agreement. Effectively, the deal between the 
EU and Turkey is such that the EU provides Turkey with funds to host Syrian refugees if 
Turkey does not act as a transit country and forward them to the EU. The EU is also 
allowed to send back asylum seekers whose claim has been declared inadmissible from 
the Greek islands to Turkey, requiring that the EU Member States host one additional 
Syrian refugee for each migrant returned to Turkey. Basically, Turkey is acting as a plug, 
and the question remains whether this a long-term solution to the problem, and for how 
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long is Turkey likely to participate in this deal. For example, Angeloni and Spano (2018, 
482) critique this deal for its questionable outlook on human rights. 
Another financial suggestion was made by Stavropoulou (2016, 9), who suggested that 
if decisions are made on a supranational level, the financing of those policies should also 
come from a supranational institution. This would mean that the financing for hosting 
refugees should come from the EU, and Stavropoulou (2016, 9) argues for a ‘fair distri-
bution of financial and human resources’. As an idea this is logical, but Stravropoulou 
does not address the issue of how to calculate the costs of hosting a refugee, for example. 
Neither is the likelihood of striking political agreement discussed. Surprisingly, none of 
the other articles supported or brought up the same idea (sharing budgets), even though 
the Dublin IV regulation entails sharing of human resources of EU institutions, such as 
Frontex and EASO. Collett (2016, 41) calls for an assessment of the needs of the hosting 
countries rather than the accessibility of funds, indicating that the current funds could be 
used in a more efficient manner.   
8.2 Alternative soft multi-dimensional solutions 
8.2.1 Involving the private sector 
Different mechanisms for implicit trade emerged from the content analysis. These all had 
in common the view that the needs of the host country should be taken into account. For 
example, Costello (2016, 14) argues that private a sponsorship programme could increase 
the number of refugees hosted in the EU. A private sponsorship programme, in which 
individuals and locals are matched to a refugee for integration, can be seen as implicit 
trade since the host countries can decide to commit to help solve the issue by sponsoring 
a refugee. Costello (2016, 14) suggests that private sponsorship is accompanied by issuing 
humanitarian visas for those whose ‘protection needs cannot be met in the region of 
origin’.  
Involving the private sector in the discussion was suggested by others as well. Roberts 
et al. (2016, 3) note that whilst it can be mutually beneficial to involve the private sector 
and the labour market, one must make sure that even though the demand for cheap labour 
in Europe is booming, the rights of all workers must be respected. Bin Talal (2016, 79) 
notes that refugees could also find manufacturing jobs in countries of first entry outside 
the EU, if exporting to the EU was made easier, thus increasing production opportunities 
in such countries. This is a way for the private sector to implicitly participate in amelio-
rating the crisis.  
58 
Collett (2016, 42) does not mention the private sector by name but calls for deeper 
collaboration between the countries of origin, host countries and international organisa-
tions. Bin Talal (2016, 79–80) also suggests that some of the EU funding spent on hard 
border control could be spent on investments in the countries of origin and, in addition, 
the EU could allow trade with the host country more freely and grant tax exemptions to 
incentivize trade. Involving the private sector and diminishing trade barriers between the 
EU and hosting countries could also be an answer to the previously discussed restrictive 
discourse issue. Instead of enforcing restrictive methods, trade between the continent al-
leviates the need to migrate to the EU. Menendez (2016, 414) notes that hosting asylum 
seekers and refugee in the EU could create positive stimuli to boost the economies hosting 
refugees in the short run. In the mid-term perspective, refugees are expected to be self-
supportive and contribute by paying taxes. In the long term, refugees could be beneficial 
and even crucial in upholding the current pension systems in the EU. (Menendez 2016, 
414.)  
 
8.2.2 Proactive measures 
Soft multi-dimensional mechanisms can also be proactive and address issues before they 
arise. Tudor (2015, 66–67) claims the solution to the problem is to fund the World Food 
Programme, which distributes food aid in countries of first entry, such as Lebanon, Jordan 
and Turkey. Hatton (2017, 479) gives support to this idea by concluding that the first step 
to address the issue is to improve the conditions of those who are in refugee camps. Tudor 
(2015, 66–67) and Hatton (2017, 479) both agree that the next step is to set up a resettle-
ment scheme, but rather than opting for an EU asylum policy, they both support interna-
tional refugee recognition at the or close to the region of origin in order to prevent haz-
ardous trips to the EU and to provide refuge for those in the most vulnerable state.  
Proactive measures suggested in the articles were often those aimed at resolving the 
crisis in the area of origin. For example, Dustmann et al. (2017, 535) concludes that ‘to 
prevent refugee movements in the future’ the EU should aim at avoiding conflict and 
instability in the Middle East. Whether this is actually a proactive measure can be con-
tested, as it is directly a reactive measure to the current crisis. However, Dustmann et al. 
(2017) do also propose the idea of using foreign policy as a proactive method to prevent 
future crises from happening, which can be seen as a proactive method. The proactive 
measures suggested in the articles seemed to be closely linked to the externalization of 
the problem, meaning committing to actions outside the EU. Externalization proposals 
also seemed to be related to a smaller share of the burden. For example, as was discussed 
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earlier, the United Kingdom hosts a small number of refugees when compared to its com-
parative size, economic strength or population. At the same time, the United Kingdom is 
the single largest contributor in terms of humanitarian aid to bordering countries of the 
Syrian refugee crisis (Roberts et al. 2016, 3). Meanwhile, the EU is criticized for making 
humanitarian aid contingent on migration controls in the countries receiving aid (Hansen 
& Randeira 2018, 995).  
Humanitarian aid is also criticised as being merely a means of postponing the issue 
rather than being a part of the solution. The needs of the refugees and asylum seekers to 
sustain livelihood are more developmental than humanitarian. These needs are, for exam-
ple, access to land and employment opportunities. Addressing development issues in the 
countries of origin and first entry are argued to be the most effective ways to limit further 
migration. (Cordova 2016, 8-9.) 
8.3 Alternative hard multi-dimensional mechanisms 
The content analysis showed that multi-dimensional mechanisms were strongly sup-
ported. In addition, the largest number of multi-dimensional suggestions were related to 
multi-dimensional hard mechanisms. As discussed earlier, multi-dimensional hard mech-
anisms are mechanisms which take into account several aspects and are mandatory by 
nature. For example, explicit compensation is considered a multi-dimensional hard mech-
anism, as everyone has to participate but they can choose the way in which they partici-
pate, for example by the number of refugees hosted vs. funds contributed to the issue. The 
content analysis showed that most suggested multi-dimensional hard mechanisms were 
based around compensation models. 
8.3.1 Italy as a hotspot 
The multi-dimensional mechanism proposed in the study by Angeloni and Spano (2018) 
is to create a hotspot area within the EU and centralize decision-making and redistribution 
in the EU to create a more effective and fair system. Angeloni and Spano (2018) suggest 
that Italy should take a leading role in the centralization of decision-making and redistri-
bution as well as the initial reception of asylum seekers. The reason why one Member 
State has been chosen to act as an intermediary instead of an EU agency is because An-
geloni and Spano (2018) believe that it is easier to reach political consensus this way. 
Italy has been chosen based on a model of game theory. According to the current Dub-
lin Regulation, the country of first entry is responsible for processing the asylum claim. 
This has burdened Italy tremendously in the past years, and changing the current system 
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is in the interest of Italy. By contrast, currently few other Member States see the revision 
of the Dublin Regulation as necessary, because most probably it would just lead to a 
bigger share of the burden. Italy thus has an incentive to foster a working burden-sharing 
mechanism within the EU. Italy is also a good candidate for the hotspot country due to 
its formal and informal diplomatic ties with north African countries. Italy is experienced 
in dealing with crisis situations and is capable of boasting a large network of humanitarian 
organisations, which can work together in rescue missions and emergency health services. 
(Angeloni & Spano 2018, 487–489.) In addition, Angeloni & Spano (2018, 489) suggest 
that immigration could be part of the solution to Italy’s aging population, low fertility 
rates and diminishing general population. 
In the proposal, Italy would act as a reception hotspot, where all asylum claims would 
be processed and initial reception handled. After the claims have been processed, a pre-
agreed number of asylum seekers would be relocated to other Member States. This would 
relieve all other Member States from administrative and initial hosting costs. A prelimi-
nary study conducted by Di Pasquale et al. (2016) estimates that the total annual cost of 
receiving the asylum seekers, processing their claims and hosting them for an initial six-
month period would be 2.165 billion euros. This sum has been reached using an estimate 
of 200,000 asylum seekers per annum. The same study estimates that over 25,000 people 
would be employed full-time through these ventures in Italy. (Angeloni & Spano 2018, 
481–482.) 
Centralising asylum claim procedures to one unified asylum procedure would guaran-
tee a fair evaluation of claims for the asylum seekers as well. It would also abolish the 
desire to apply for asylum in a different Member State because of perceived more lenient 
approval. This would also inherently discourage the need for smugglers and human traf-
ficking, since decision-making would be centralized and people would not benefit from 
trafficking between Member States. (Angeloni & Spano 2018.) 
As with other proposed mechanisms, the Italian proposal also allows asylum seekers 
to express their preferred location. This has been taken into account in the system because 
it makes secondary movement less desirable and accelerates the process of integration in 
the host country. Another similarity is that the mechanism allows host countries to present 
their interests as well. The Italian proposal goes further than other mechanisms and sug-
gests that host countries can specify their interests in the desired skills the asylum seekers 
should have after the six-month initial hosting period to integrate the refugees in the host 
countries’ labour market most efficiently. (Angeloni & Spano 2018.) 
Obvious positive aspects in the Italian proposal lay in the inherent savings that could 
be achieved through the centralization of the system. In addition, savings could be made 
within the EASO and Frontex personnel, as they would mainly be stationed in Italy. An-
geloni & Spano (2018, 488) also note that the centralized system would lessen the amount 
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of irregular and unlawful migration, decreasing the national need for border control sys-
tems and defensive measures. Preliminary estimates show that no ‘fresh money’ would 
be needed to implement the Italian proposal, as redirecting current funds would be suffi-
cient. (Angeloni & Spano 2018.) 
The Italian proposal offers a multi-dimensional hard mechanism, which takes into ac-
count the preferences of host countries and asylum seekers as well as aspects of the cur-
rent problem. The explicit compensation is that other Member States finance Italy via the 
EU budget. A fatal flaw in the proposal is that it lacks suggestions as to how refugees 
should be distributed among Member States and confines itself to stating that it should be 
a pre-agreed number. In addition, the system lacks political approval at the EU level as 
well as at the Italian level. The fatal flaw of not addressing the distribution of refugees 
makes the system as such a suboptimal one, because the core issue is not addressed. 
Building a hotspot within the EU was a completely unique idea proposed by Angeloni 
and Spano (2018). Most articles argue, instead, that refugee recognition should be exter-
nalized and handled outside EU borders (see for example Hatton 2017; Dustmann et al. 
2017).  
Dustmann et al. (2017, 534) argue that a coordinated refugee system needs centralized 
decision making outside the EU, meaning that asylum claims should be decided upon 
when the person in question is still in the country of origin or in a country of first entry. 
This kind of externalized handling of claims could ensure more coherent results and act 
as a base for a resettlement mechanism. Dustmann et al. (2017, 534.) Leonard and 
Kaunert (2016, 50) criticize external ‘transit centres’ for their questionable outlook on 
human rights issues, procedural and practical challenges. For example, whether handling 
asylum claims outside the EU would be any savings is contested (Leonard & Kaunert 
2016, 50).  
8.3.2 External actions 
Emiliani (2017) goes further than Italy, completely outside the EU. The research proposes 
that the refugees and even migration in general be dealt with external actions managed 
by the EU. This would mainly focus on partnerships and agreements with third countries, 
made by the European Commission on behalf of the Member States. A full-fledged goal 
is to establish EU migration diplomacy that would act as a tool to handle migration to the 
EU. Niemann and Zaun (2018, 8–9) support the idea of external actions as a part of the 
solution. The EU-Turkey Statement could act as a leading example for similar Statements 
with Afghanistan and Mali, for example. However, at the same time the EU-Turkey State-
ment is being criticized for its small impact in relative terms (Niemann & Zaun 2018, 8–
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9). Emiliani (2017, 25) notes that an external actions system could be developed by add-
ing dimensions which take into account the Member States need for special labour or 
ageing population. These issues could be addressed through external migration manage-
ment.  
External actions are argued to be the most efficient way to tackle the problem, since 
the EU is already committing to mitigating the root causes of migration in countries of 
origin. It is also in the interest of the Union to have reliable partnerships with third coun-
tries to keep partners accountable in order to maintain good relationships. External actions 
are also deeply rooted in the history of Member States. Many Member States, for example 
Italy and France, have bilateral agreements with third countries. It is also considered to 
be a politically more viable solution, as it does not impose on the sovereignty of Member 
States in a way that a system which requires common governance does. (Emiliani 2017, 
25–28.)  
Tougher border control is also considered an external action to control migration and 
asylum seeking. Strengthening border control shifts the responsibility of lodging asylum 
claims to third countries outside the EU. Current conduct has proved that there is a general 
will to abide by EU directives and regulations in a stricter manner than before the crisis, 
because the impacts are immediate in Member States. Member States have been more 
willing to cooperate in border control issues because it shifts the burden outside the EU, 
and thus no Member State is worse off participating in integration, as would be the case 
for redistributive quotas. (Niemann & Zaun 2018, 14–15.) 
On the other hand, external actions do not offer a clear-cut solution to the vast amounts 
of refugees. The number of claims is dependent on the situation in the sending countries 
and cannot be controlled by the EU. In addition, the admittance and reception of refugees 
is conducted on a voluntary basis in the EU-Turkey deal, for example, and the deal has 
shown that the EU is unable to keep its end of the agreement based on voluntariness 
(Emiliani 2017, 24). The lack of viability in upholding potential future agreements is a 
crucial failing in the method. Menendez (2016, 414) critiques external agreements with 
third countries as being unsustainable, unfair and unstable solutions for the issue. Kugiel 
(2016, 57) sees them as sometimes being a way to ‘veil unwillingness to take part in 
solving the problem’. Though policy-wise the external actions method would be ideal to 
implement and would only require a limited amount of additional legal power for the 
Commission, the system cannot allocate and handle the amounts of refugees and asylum 
claims received during peak years.  
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8.3.3 Tradable Refugee-Admission Quotas 
Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 3–6) devised their own multilateral system, known as the 
Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas (TRAQ). This model takes into account the country-
specific costs of accommodating a refugee or an asylum seeker, the maximization of cost- 
effectiveness, the preferences of refugees and asylum seekers and the host country’s pref-
erence type of displaced person. (Moraga and Rapoport 2015, 3–6). 
Moraga’s and Rapoport’s (2015, 3–6) system is based on two basic assumptions: (1) 
granting refuge to acknowledged refugees is considered a basic human right and an inter-
national public good (as Hatton 2017 argued) and (2) providing refuge and protection to 
refugees and asylum seekers generates costs for the host country, which can be seen as a 
‘burden’. The system is market-based, where countries are assigned an initial quota of 
refugees, which they can then trade with other participating countries. The system seeks 
to find and always ends with an optimal solution, where the marginal net cost of hosting 
one additional refugee or asylum seeker equals to that of another country (excluding zero 
as an option), as illustrated in Figure 8. They argue that this type of mechanism would be 
most cost-efficient because refugees and asylum seekers would be hosted in countries 
where it is most economical. (Moraga & Rapoport, 2014, 650.) 
 
Figure 8 Example of an equilibrium where the marginal net cost of one additional 
asylum seeker or refugee equals that of another country (Moraga & 
Rapoport 2014, 652). 
Figure 8 illustrates an example market with two participants. Market equilibrium is 
achieved at a point where the marginal net costs equal each other. The marginal net cost 
curves of each country are shown on the vertical axis and the point where the quantities 
of refugees hosted (mNZ and mA) cross paths is the market optimum. This means that in 
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this equilibrium, country A is willing to receive more asylum seekers and refugees and 
get paid for doing so by country NZ, who, in turn, is willing to pay for not receiving the 
initial quota amount assigned to it. (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 652.) 
Moraga and Rapoport (2015) argue that their system could be used to solve the Syrian 
refugee crisis and should be limited to an EU Member State market only. They demon-
strate that the number of initial quotas assigned does not affect the competence of the 
system “as long as the market is competitive”. On a technical level, the competitiveness 
of the market would be ensured by a computerized continuous double auction mechanism. 
From the point of view of policy, the market can be made rational and more effective by 
carefully deliberated distribution of initial quotas. Moraga and Rapoport suggest (2014, 
652) that Member States which would benefit the most from trading their quotas to money 
would be allocated a higher initial quota. This would ensure that it is always more rational 
to participate in the market rather than stay out of it. Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 5) refer 
to Thielemann et al. (2010) who argue that financial compensation is one of the most 
preferred solidarity mechanisms by Member States.  
Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 3–4) refer to Wagner and Kraler (2014), who have stud-
ied different quota systems suggested or implemented by Member States throughout his-
tory. They compare seven different quota distribution systems, of which four are largely 
based on economic strength and population, two criteria which are often highly corre-
lated. The three other quota distribution methods take into account other factors, such as 
mean asylum application amount, share of EU GDP and number of applicant and admitted 
asylum seekers in the past three years. As Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 4) point out, the 
different distribution quota systems yield rather similar results, with more economically 
developed Member States being assigned the largest quotas.  
Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 5) include in their Tradable Refugee-Admission Quota 
(TRAQ) system a very similar matching system to that suggested by Jones and Tey-
telboym (2016, 80). The matching system could be built to take into consideration the 
preferences of the refugees and the host countries. Moraga and Rapoport (2015) do not 
go as far as others previously mentioned, who suggest that cultural preferences such as 
religion and language should be taken into account, but the system is built to maintain 
several indicators and if needed, so cultural preferences could also technically be added.  
Generally, the content analysis showed that even though multi-dimensional mecha-
nisms were not as prominent as simpler one-dimensional mechanisms, there was great 
interest in the TRAQ system. Altogether eight articles, in addition to Moraga’s and 
Rapoport’s own, referenced the TRAQ system. This accounts for 14 percent of the articles 
analysed. The percentage can be seen as relatively high since the TRAQ is a specific 
model of a specific subcategory. The TRAQ model has undeniably been noted in the 
academic field. In addition, Mitchell (2017, 323) gives support to a lottery or bidding 
system, which the TRAQ system can be seen as, when relocating refugees.  
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Dustmann et al. (2017, 532–533) gave support to the TRAQ model and additionally 
suggested that attention should be paid to where to relocate refugees within Member 
States. Dustmann et al. (2017, 533) advocate relocating refugees where the costs of host-
ing are lowest and integration chances highest. These tend to be areas where other refu-
gees already reside, providing a support network. On the other hand, the political costs of 
relocation must also be taken into account. Even though, in financial terms, hosting refu-
gees in urban areas is often more expensive, the political costs of hosting refugees in rural 
areas might trump the financial costs of hosting them in urban areas. (Dustmann et al. 
2017, 531–533.) 
Bauböck (2018, 141–142) commends the TRAQ model for offering an alternative 
method of contributing. The choice between hosting refugees and contributing financially 
to help other Member States host refugees might be politically the difference between a 
deal and no deal. Niemann and Zaun (2018, 16) concur that the TRAQ is a valid contender 
as it offers countries refusing to host refugees the opportunity to contribute. Hatton (2017, 
485–486) suggests that the TRAQ model might be able to encourage Member States to 
participate in a resettlement programme if they were made a stakeholder, i.e. have a pref-
erence, but reaching an agreement with more than a million spontaneous asylum applica-
tion a year seems unlikely.  
Thielemann (2018, 78) also gives credit to the TRAQ model for its built-in efficiency 
but deems it difficult to avoid the political backlash of being reframed as ‘treating refu-
gees as commodities’. Even though Thielemann (2018, 78) recognizes the problem, he 
sees that more imperative and binding methods are necessary to ‘strengthen compliance’. 
Improved monitoring, binding rules and less discretion are the means needed to overcome 
collective action dilemmas according to public goods literature (Thielemann 2018, 78). 
Thielemann (2018, 79) argues for multi-dimensional mechanisms, as they can prevent 
political deadlock and be more efficient. But unlike Niemann and Zaun (2018, 16), who 
credit the system for allowing that Member States refuse to host refugees to contribute in 
a different manner, Thielemann (2018, 79) calls for the restriction of financial compen-
sation and no Member State should be able to ‘buy themselves out’ and should contribute 
at least in some in way in a resettlement initiative.  
 The TRAQ system takes into account multiple dimensions and it can be considered a 
multi-dimensional hard mechanism. This means that the ‘bur- den’ is shared in an ampler 
way throughout the Member States. On the other hand, the TRAQ system is based on 
quotas, which are an imperative form of regulations. The sys- tem is similar to the Kyoto 
emission trading scheme but takes into account more comprehensively various dimen-
sions of refugee and asylum seeker policies. The content analysis showed that imperative 
measures are strongly supported and both one- and multi-dimensional soft mechanisms 
failed to address key points of the issue, such as the sharing of the burden or distribution 
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of quotas. Both the one- and multi-dimensional hard mechanisms showed variety. How-
ever, it seems the articles build considerable support for quota-based systems, especially 





9.1 Reflections on the research questions 
The aim of this study was to gain a holistic understanding of the burden-sharing mecha-
nisms available for addressing the post 2015 crisis era. To be able to reach a well-rounded 
understanding of the question, two sub-questions were posed. In addition to the main 
research question, this thesis studied the reasons why the issue needs to be addressed as 
well as the prerequisites proposed for mechanisms. The reasons for addressing the issue 
seem straightforward; the existing methods do not work in the current situation. All but 
one of the articles studied mentioned the 2015 crisis and most articles continued to refer-
ence the inadequacy of the current system as motivation to study alternative methods.  
The expressed flaws in the current system were abundant. Most of the criticism related 
to the Dublin Regulation, because it fails offer ways to share the burden of asylum seekers 
and refugees between Member States. Based on the articles studied, it can be concluded 
that the main problem with the current system is that it does not provide solutions for how 
to share the burden of asylum seekers and refugees. Southern Member States are still 
inequitably burdened by the large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, while eastern 
European and some central European Member States are closing their borders. The cri-
tique on the current system was evident, and interestingly, the EU decision-making capa-
bilities were also criticised. No solution can help if the EU is unable to find a way to agree 
on one. Sharing the burden also proved to be an important prerequisite for any new sys-
tem. No articles contested the fact that the current distribution is inequitable.  
Interestingly, even though almost all articles mentioned the 2015 crisis, the reasons for 
addressing the issue were not limited to the 2015 crisis and the flaws in the current system. 
Multiple articles made reference to megatrends, such as environmental and economic is-
sues as well as demographic changes. In particular, the growing population of the African 
Continent was mentioned as a future trend. In addition, the expected environmental 
changes in African and Middle Eastern countries was noted. One clear observation is that 
the African and Middle Eastern countries will become increasingly more important to the 
EU. References to African and Middle Eastern countries were made in the articles when 
discussing prerequisites and mechanisms as well. Most external activities that were pro-
posed in the articles, in particular, mainly involved countries in Africa and the Middle 
East.  
Besides the crisis, the flaws in the current system and the megatrends, other reasons 
for addressing the issue were also proposed in the articles. These included security and 
integration questions as well as discourse issues. Interestingly, security issues, which are 
most prominently evident in the media, were only addressed twice in the mechanisms that 
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were proposed in the articles. Needless to say, the military aid model obviously addressed 
security issues. In addition, security questions were brought up in discourse that involved 
discussing why it is imperative to deliberate where to resettle refugees. Based on the ar-
ticles analysed, it can be concluded that security issues do not appear to play a major role 
in addressing the issue.  
The articles analysed clearly illustrated the need to explore the issue from angles other 
than those examined to date if a solution is to be found. It can be argued that the suggested 
change in discourse from problem-oriented to opportunity-oriented might be linked with 
the need to address megatrends, as megatrends could eventually make constant refugee 
flows of the current ‘crisis’ magnitude a new norm. Thus, addressing the issue through a 
lens of opportunities could quite possibly yield new solutions. In general, it can be said 
that the 2015 crisis and the flaws in the current system have been a major driver for re-
search, but other underlying reasons for addressing the issue reveal that research is much 
needed and timely.  
The prerequisite that was mostly commonly proposed was that of a supranational gov-
ernance of some kind. However, many forms of governance can be deemed viable. Bilat-
eral, EU-level and even global-level governance were all suggested, the EU-level being 
the most common suggestion. This is probably at least to some extent tied to the geo-
graphical limitations set in this thesis. Studies focused on the EU will often tend to suggest 
EU-level governance, as it is already a well-established common area. In this light, sug-
gestions of bilateral or global governance are interesting because they are less obvious 
proposals. Bilateral governance looks to find efficiency in swift decision-making whilst 
global governance deemed justifiable due to the sheer scale of the problem. Just as the 
CEAS was criticized of its inability to implement and enforce accountability, the articles 
did not see an easy solution to the governance issues, as many articles noted that agreeing 
on supranational governance seems to be impossible at the moment. To ease the pressure, 
crisis-based supranational governance models were suggested because in most cases such 
models leave decision-making to the national governments.  
Unlike supranational governance, where there was broad support for some level of 
governance, border control as a prerequisite, instead, was a more polarized prerequisite. 
Some strongly advocated enforced border control while others called for non-restrictive 
border control and granting humanitarian visas. The border control issue demonstrates 
that there is no one right solution to the refugee crisis, but instead, different models should 
be investigated and evaluated. Enforced border control was often a prerequisite for a hard 
mechanism while non-restrictive border control initiatives were generally linked to advo-
cating for a change in the discourse or to opportunity-oriented mechanisms. Even though, 
based purely on frequency, border control was one of the most predominant prerequisites, 
the results demonstrated that no one given type of border control appears to be a general 
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requirement. On the other hand, any one given system can depend on a specific type of 
border control even though, by and large, it does not seem to be a constant.  
The results demonstrated that the most commonly suggested one-dimensional mecha-
nisms were the types of mechanisms that were already proposed as examples in the theory 
of international burden-sharing mechanisms from over decade ago. Most articles advo-
cating one-dimensional mechanisms suggested different types of redistributive quotas. 
However, the theory offered voluntary pledging systems as an example of an international 
burden-sharing mechanism, but this model did not show up in the results. The results 
clearly supported hard, imperative one-dimensional mechanisms rather than soft mecha-
nisms. The softness of the mechanisms was sometimes due to the limitations of interna-
tional law, as was in the case for the suggested European refugee quota model. The results 
support one-dimensional mechanisms as a possible solution to the issue and they strongly 
advocate a hard, one-dimensional mechanism.  
The results clearly showed that there is an academic interest in soft and hard multi-
dimensional mechanisms as well. Catering to the opportunity-based scope, which is cat-
egorized as a soft mechanism, some articles supported involving the private sector. This 
could be done in the host country or in the country of origin by means of trade and tax 
exemptions. This also supports the non-restrictive approach, which was generally fa-
voured by universities and businesses. Other soft, multi-dimensional methods discussed 
in the articles were proactive methods, which were largely based on financial support in 
third countries. The discussion on humanitarian aid, and the manner in which EU ties it 
with border control, was almost as polarized as the border control conversation. Human-
itarian aid was seen as an easy political solution and as a way to evade the issue altogether. 
The results revealed there was more support for developmental aid, which addresses the 
economic, sociological, environmental and political issues too.  
Multi-dimensional hard mechanisms were not suggested as frequently as one-dimen-
sional hard mechanisms. However, multi-dimensional hard mechanisms seemed to ad-
dress the issues that one-dimensional hard mechanisms failed to provide an answer to. 
Based on the results, the multi-dimensional hard mechanism that was supported the most 
was the TRAQ model. It is worth noting that support for the TRAQ system was signifi-
cant, when taking into account the number of references and support offered to a single 
model. The TRAQ model incorporated the most popular one-dimensional hard mecha-
nism, namely a redistributive quota, in the system. In addition, it was based on a market-
based mechanism, which allows for Member States to choose the way they participate, 
thus finding agreement easier.  
Even though the TRAQ model was the single most referenced model, it was also crit-
icized to some extent for treating refugees as commodities. In addition, the method was 
criticized for essentially allowing richer Member States to ‘buy themselves out’ without 
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hosting any refugees. This shortfall could be resolved by setting a restriction on the num-
ber of quotas that can be traded. This way, Member States could only trade a limited 
number of their quotas. Setting a restriction would, however, reduce the likelihood of 
reaching an agreement on the system and should therefore be carefully evaluated.  
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the results. One key conclusion is 
that the 2015 crisis has instigated a new surge of research on the topic, even though un-
derlying reasonings are much more heterogenic. The only constant prerequisite for a func-
tioning system seems to be supranational governance at some level. Based on the results, 
mechanisms of an imperative by nature were the ones that were supported the most. The 
results showed support for both one-dimensional and multi-dimensional mechanisms. 
The most frequently suggested mechanisms were redistributive quota systems. Market-
based quota systems were also supported by the results, as they were perceived as poten-
tially easier to implement. It is interesting to note that the EU proposals follow the sug-
gestions of the academia, not by applying any given model, but by proposing more im-
perative actions, multi-dimensional models in which contributions can be ones that do not 
involve hosting refugees alone and a quota-based crisis mechanism. These are proposed 
in the Dublin IV Regulation currently being discussed in the Council. Based on the re-
sults, in can be concluded that the EU and the academia have both shifted towards hard 
mechanisms and, to ensure agreement, towards multi-dimensional mechanisms. The dif-
ference in the suggestions made by these academic articles is that the additional dimen-
sions are based on efficiency, country-specific advantages and the ability choose, while 
it seems the additional dimensions the EU suggests are a political tool to reach an agree-
ment on a more imperative method. 
9.2 Theoretical and practical implications and limitations to the 
study 
The theoretical implications of this study are limited. This thesis does not offer any new 
theories; instead, it offers a holistic view of the subject in the field of academia. Collecting 
and analysing the views of the academia is the theoretical implication of this thesis. This 
thesis offers a general view of what has been suggested and what options are available, 
setting them into context with the existing theory.  
On the other hand, the theoretical implications of this study can be very useful in prac-
tical terms. The results of this thesis offer an overview, which can be useful when decid-
ing which methods should be further investigated and testing their feasibility in being 
implemented in practice.  
This thesis has some evident strengths and weaknesses. The fact that it is solely fo-
cused on published academic articles on the topic limits the number of possible solutions 
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since other forums are not analyzed. On the other hand, studying only academically pub-
lished studies ensures the suggested mechanisms are fairly well studied and can be re-
garded as somewhat viable solutions.  
By analyzing the academic articles within the framework of the existing theory on 
international burden sharing, it can be concluded that the EU’s actions seemed to follow 
political cues rather than academic suggestions. This proved that studying only academic 
solutions lacks institutional realism. Even though many of articles studied noted that 
reaching a conclusion on the EU level is hard, to say the least, they still essentially sug-
gested only methods which required some level of supranational governance. This goes 
to show that, based on academic studies on the subject, national actions are not well 
equipped to address the issue. A common solution is called for, whether it be on an EU 
level or on a global level, or even just a bilateral one, and the results of this content anal-
ysis support the argument that cooperation is key.  
This study was conducted with the aim of gaining a holistic view of the possible meth-
ods available. Thus, it does not analyse specific models in detail. This limits the theoret-
ical and practical implications of the study, as it does not analyse or advocate any specific 
model. This means the results of this study as such cannot be transposed on practical 
level. Instead, the results give guidance on the direction in which suggestions are evolving 
and which alternatives should be further researched and investigated. This research gives 
indications of which models could possibly be first to be tested or modelled on a practical 
level.  
9.3 Where the EU is at now 
Although we can see EU regulation proposals moving towards a multi-dimensional hard 
mechanism, we can question whether is the EU moving at all, if no decisions can be 
agreed reached. The refugee issue has been on the agenda at high-level EU negotiations 
for quite some time already. The Council has mainly discussed the new proposed Dublin 
Regulation IV, which still remains unresolved. As previously noted, the proposed Dublin 
IV implements an imperative crisis-activated relocation scheme based on quotas calcu-
lated for each Member State according to the criteria described in chapter 3.1.4. This 
could be seen as a clear step towards multi-dimensional mechanisms. 
On the other hand, it has been observed that future compromise suggestions of the 
Council could move towards enforced border control – a one-dimensional hard mecha-
nism. This would be effected by enforcing internal and external border controls through 
EU instruments (Borsa 2018). Whether this is an easier solution for Member States to 
agree on remains to be seen. It seems as the current Commission is running out of political 
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steam. A new Commission will assume office in November 2019 following the EU elec-
tions in May 2019. The new Commission might possibly produce proposals for mecha-
nisms that could perhaps satisfy all Member States. It is worth bearing in mind that while 
this thesis discusses the mechanisms at a theoretical level, the potential it offers at the 
practical level is strongly related to the decision-making climate of the EU. If it is not 
implemented, no mechanism can help ameliorate inequitable burden sharing.  
9.4 Suggestions for further research 
The research on this topic is still quite limited and further research could be conducted on 
various angles of the topic. This research indicates that especially the implementation of 
multi-dimensional mechanisms should be further investigated. These mechanisms could 
be modelled using economic models developed in the field of forced migration econom-
ics. Economics of forced migration could provide useful methods of estimating the effects 
of different models on the host country and the country of origin. It is important to under-
stand the consequences of each mechanism before implementing any method at the EU 
level. Understanding and projecting the implementation of mechanisms could also further 
the incentives of reaching an agreement, because the mechanisms become more predict-
able.  
This research clearly described the academic support for redistributive quotas. Their 
legality and implementation should be further studied. In addition, alternative redistribu-
tion keys should also be studied, as they offer different redistributive quotas for Member 
States. On the other hand, the articles analysed all seemed to conclude that the current 
distribution is unequal and suggested that distribution keys often allocated refugees in a 
similar manner, i.e. a larger quota for more economically established Member States. In-
dividual quotas and the basis of the quota might still play a crucial role in the politics of 
reaching a decision. Hence, the redistribution key alternatives should be investigated even 
though current studies demonstrate that different distribution keys yield similar results.  
In addition, this research supports further studies of the TRAQ model. The articles 
gave strong support to this particular method and its implementation possibilities should 
be further researched. The researchers of the TRAQ model have themselves conducted 
simulations of the model but further research should be conducted to validate and extend 
the understanding of the implementation of the TRAQ mechanism.  
Moreover, the results of this content analysis demonstrated that the current situation 
might not be a ‘one-off’ but might instead give indication of what the future might hold. 
Analysing the issue from this perspective calls for proactive mechanisms as well. The 
effects of proactive methods should be further studied, as the articles showed that they 
are currently on a theoretical level and there are no hard figures, for example, for how 
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much granting tax exemptions to countries of first entry would encourage refugees to 
build a livelihood in those areas and thereby further reducing migration to the EU. The 
effects of trade-related methods should be further studied, as they could offer similar ad-
vantages to the development of the regions of origin as trade has offered to other parts of 
the world. History has shown that non-restrictive trade policies increase total wealth and 
the benefits of free trade commonly recognised by the field of economics. The fields of 
social science and cultural studies could also give valuable insight into how and where 
humanitarian or development aid would be most beneficial. By addressing developmental 
issues it becomes easier to address the root causes of migration, thereby decreasing the 
numbers of displaced persons. A proactive model should always be accompanied by a 
reactive model, such as the TRAQ system, to ensure that people in the most vulnerable 




This thesis studied how burden-sharing should be addressed in the EU post 2015. The 
study was conducted by using a qualitative content analysis method. This method built 
on the existing theory of international burden-sharing methods and was supported by two 
sub-questions: why should the issue be addressed and what are the prerequisites for a 
functioning system. The study of these sub-questions was data-driven and the results gen-
erated four main categories for each sub-question. The data chosen for this study con-
sisted of peer-reviewed academic articles published in 2015 or later.  
The results demonstrated that the 2015 crisis has acted as a catalyst for research and 
has been the main motivator for instigating research within this topic. Other major moti-
vations for research were the inadequacies of the current system, environmental and eco-
nomic issues and demographic changes. The reasons for addressing the issue were close 
to uniform. By contrast, support for various prerequisites was far from uniform. The re-
sults illustrated that some level of supranational governance is called for. However, bor-
der control as a prerequisite is questionable, as some argued for enforced border control 
and some for non-restrictive border control. Border control does not seem to be a signif-
icant prerequisite for a functioning system, even though it can be instrumental for a given 
system to function.  
The results of the content analysis showed that hard mechanisms are strongly advo-
cated. There was significant support for one-dimensional redistributive quotas as well as 
multi-dimensional market-based mechanisms. The essential difference between these 
systems seems to lie in the likelihood of reaching political agreement, which according 
to the academic articles would be easier to find by using multi-dimensional mechanisms. 
On the other hand, when the mechanisms were compared with the current actions in the 
EU, we noted that the multi-dimensional Dublin IV has been at a standstill since it was 
proposed in 2016. This does not prove that one-dimensional mechanisms would be easier 
to reach agreement on but poses a challenge for the institutions as well as the Member 
States. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the results of the content analysis follow the theory 
of international burden-sharing. Hence the theory seems to cover all possible alternatives. 
It can also be concluded that the EU’s actions have been moving towards academically 
supported, multi-dimensional mechanisms. On the other hand, the current negotiation 
stalemate seems to be shifting the EU’s perspective towards one-dimensional mecha-
nisms, as initial information on current meetings would seem to indicate. The results of 
this thesis offer a holistic overview of the topic and different mechanisms proposed by 
academic literature. They can be used to assess which mechanisms should be further in-
vestigated or tested in practice. This thesis also provided ample suggestions for further 
research to tackle the issue by means of more innovative approaches.  
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